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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The congressional elections of 1994 rocked Washington and the country with the
ousting of the Democratic party's long-standing control of the Congress. Less than two
years later radical welfare reductions were signed into law by the democratic president.
The reemergence of conservative ideology has brought calls for the slashing of
government programs and a renewed zeal for the free market. This enthusiasm for the
market mechanism rests on the belief that unfettered economic exchange will yield the
most efficient allocation of resources to society. This belief is based on the implicit
assumption that markets tend to be competitive in the absence of governmental
intervention.

Given the growing demand to limit the government's direct intervention in

matters of the economy, it is imperative to know if and when markets are competitive.
The solution to this question has been at the root of industrial organization since
the 1950' s with the early empirical work of economist Joe Bain. It is now over forty years
later and there is still a lack of a definitive answer to this fundamental query. It is not
from lack of effort - hundreds of theoretical and empirical papers have been published on
this topic. Why the answer should be so elusive stems largely from two basic limitations
to economic inquiry:
I) Explicit and implicit political values influencing research.
2) The difficulty in applying the experimental design to economic questions.
The two are related of course, but each plays its own role in preventing economists - and
society - from reaching definitive conclusions to economic problems.

This paper is not a discourse on the subjective

(political) nature of economic

analysis, hut it is important to briefly touch upon the political ramifications
conclusions

about market performance.

Conservative

and research thut show thai the US economy
industries.

economists

tend to produce theory

is largely comprised of competitive

These results provide the bases for arguments

the form of regulations

inherent in

and anti-trust litigation

that government

is unnecessary

intervention

and even damaging

in

to the

economy.
Far from being destructive,
intervention
economy.

as an important

economics

component

Liberal economists

uncompetitive

- supporting

liberal economists

tend to view government

in ensuring the efficient operation of the

often reach the conclusion

that concentrated

regulation policies and anti-trust action.

Of course, in

there are more than these two general views but much of industrial

organization can be viewed as a struggle between the Conservative-Liberal
Harold Demsetz clearly saw the role of ideology when he cautioned
(Scherer and Ross

j

dichotomy.

"believing

is seeing."

990, p.447)

While the root of conflict within industrial organization
explicit focus of scholarly

tends to be political, the

writings tends to be on methodological

arguments over the correct approach to test market competitiveness
market power - is a reflection
economics.

industries are

of the difficulty

The variety of

- tbe absence of

in applying the scientific paradigm

The sheer number of potential economic

all economic objects are overdermined

issues.

relationships

to

and the possibility

that

- both the causes and effects of every other object

2

- renders a true controlled experiment
Resnick,

a virtual impossibility

for the economist

(Wolf and

1987 p. 20).
That said. it should also be pointed out that the degree to which empirical

economics

strays from the ideal is diminishing.

and improvements in data collection, economic
tocused.

Assertions of overdetcrminism

capture and analyze information,

results

With progress in computational
analysis is becoming increasingly

aside, as technology
1'1'0111

ability

improves our ability to

empirical economic research will become

much more robust.
An example of resent advances in data collection
at supermarket

checkout lines. Information

printed on a product's
of purchase.
result

IS

package.

This information

is the use of computer

scanners

about each product is stored on a bar code

The bar card is read by the checkout scanner at the point
is then captured

and saved in a computer

a database that has a wealth of information

including price, size, and some marketing

database.

The

about the sale of branded products -

information

- over time and across markets.

This type of data -unheard of only a few years ago- provides the opportunity
apply theoretically

defined empirical demand models to the study of competition.

past such models were difficult to apply due to severe data limitations.
to estimate the demand conditions

to
In the

It is now possible

for branded products within specific industries

where

this data is collected.
Demand conditions

are the changes in consumer

marketing changes made by firms. Consumers'

purchases due to price and

reactions to market changes are often

measured as elasticities - a percent change in demand due to a percent change in price or

marketing van abies. For example, a percent change in price will correspond
percentage

change in quantity demanded.

to a certain

The demand elasticity for a given firm's

product depends in part on the market structure of the industry.
The market structure of an industry can take several forms.

The major market

types are listed below in Table 1. Market structure in this schema is determined
the number of competitors

by both

and the existence of product differentiation.

Table 1
Principal Seller's Market Structure Types

N umber of Sellers
A Few

One

Many

Products
Homogeneous
Differentiated
-

----

Pure

Homogeneous

Pure

monopoly

oligopoly

competition

Pure multiproduct

Differentiated

Monopolistic

monopoly

oli~opoly

comp,e0ti0!1_ ------

'-

Source: Scherer and Ross, 1990

In general economists

agree to theory pertaining

difficult. however, to find the exact demarcation

to monopoly and pure competition.
between oligopolistic

and competitive

markets.

"The key to the distinction
consider themselves

is subjective

conscious

rivals ....

- whether or not the sellers
If the sellers are sufficiently

in number to have each believe (a) that its economic
perceptibly

influenced

fortunes are

by the market actions of other individual

4

few

firms, and

It is

(h) that those firms are in turn affected significantly
then the market can be said to be oligopolistic".

r

by its own actions,

(Scherer and Ross, 1990.

17)

The propensity

for this awareness

increases as the number of firms in the market

decreases.
According

to Scherer and Ross: "Pure monopolists,

oligopolists,

and monopolistic

competitors share a common characteristic: each recognizes that its output decisions have
infl uenee on pnce
. ...
a percepu ible
) e III

Allhtree

types possess ... mar kt'e power

.

I"

(Scherer and Ross, 1990 p. [7) Firms that leverage market power extract profits by
pricing above marginal costs. Market power can be neutralized,

however, if entry in and

out of the market by new firms is free and frictionless.
Pricing strategies that raise price above marginal cost can only be maintained if
entry of new firms is restricted.
of increased competition

Barriers to entry prevent the self-correcting

from forcing prices back to cost levels.

not enjoy this form of protection

However,

A monopoly

that does

will not realize profit because any positive difference

between price and cost will be immediately
competitors.

mechanism

such instantanious

eliminated

due to instantaneous

entry by

entry is limited in real markets but the extent

of barriers to entry has become a central element of market structure.
The complexity
economists

of market models incorporating

strategic behavior

seeking a simple and clear theory for markets with few firms.

primary approaches

to carrying out market power analysis.

"italicized in original
5

has stymied
There are two

The first is to study several

industries at Once to see if general results hold across industries. These studies tend to be
structural profit studies, where profit is regressed on some comhmation

of concentration

and market share. The second is the case study approach which analyzes a single industry
for market power.

Although a more detailed discussion

of the different approaches

is

found in chapter two, this thesis uses the case study approach to estimate brand-level
price clast icitics in the margarine industry.

The primary objectives
I)

of this paper are:

to apply newly available retail data to estimate brand level elasticities

2) to test for market power in the form of differentiation
Until recently elasticities
provided economists

have been estimated

differentiated

brands within an industry.

different

If the brand level

are small in absolute value (less than 100) than the products are

from one another.

Product differentiation

The estimated price elasticities
determine

only at the industry level. This has

with aggregate measures of demand useful in comparing

industries but not very useful at comparing
price elasticities

for the margarine industry.

if margarine is differentiated

for individual

brands of margarine

and unlike its complement

degree of product differentiation

will be used to

and therefore not perfectly competitive.

margarine industry was chosen because of the availability
detailed estimations

creates market power.

The

of scanner data needed for the

product, butter, margarine

has achieved a

despite a minimal degree of physical differentiation

among brands.

6

Even before estimating
margarine can be reduced.

elasticities

ruled out. A four firm concentration

To complicate

(in Table I) for

In 1992 there were no less than 103 margarine brands

produced by 47 different manufactures,

suggests a differentiated

the possible market structures

thus Monopoly,

both pure and multi-product,

ratio of 80%,and an advertising

is

sales ratio of 4.3 %

oligopoly.

matters many manufactures

sold more than one brand.

In 1992

"the average number of brands sold by a manufacturer was 2.14 brands, it
varied from 24 brands by Unilever to just one brand per firm. Philip
Morris marketed the next highest number of brands with nine; followed by
Borden Inc. with six; Nabisco with four; and Dean Foods, Sunnyland,
PYO INTL., Miami Margarine, Cl'C International and Osceola Foods each
with three. Ten manufacturers marketed two brands and the rest had one
brand each. Although the majority of the manufacturers marketed more
than a single brand only the top five market more than three brands."
(Andonov 1995, pp 17-18)
It was noted that margarine tends to be similar across brands.
expected that each brand is an almost perfect substitute - consumers
equivalent-

for any other brand.

view brands as

If this were true we would expect to see one price for all

brands -equal goods should sell at equal prices.
Table 2 suggests that - product similarities
substitutes,

It might be

A look at margarine

prices for 1992 in

aside - margarine brands are not perfect

although here we do not control for the location of the retail market.

7

Table 2
Frequency Distrihution of the Price per Pound of Branded Margarine
for the 6205 Observations, 1992'
Maraarine Prices in Dollars

Freuuencv

less than 0.30

6

0.30 - 044

737

045 - 0.59

755

060 - 0.74

1007

0.75 - 0.89

917

0.90 - 1.04

715

105 - 1.19

60S

120 - 1.34

694

1.35 - 149

656

1.50 - 1.64

385

165 - 1.79

168

180 - 194

44

ereater than 1.94
Source: (Andonov, 1995)
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Table 2 is made up of margarine prices taken from 65 regional markets over the
four quarters of 1992. Prices for the most expensive margarine in Table 2 are over six
times that of the lowest priced brands. The large price differences and the existence of
multi-brand firms strongly suggest that the margarine industry is differentiated.

'All brands in the 65 markets and all four quarters of 1992 are included here.

This thesis will test if the margarine industry is differentiated
estimating

the own and cross-price

by directly

elasticities of demand of the major national brands.

It

is expected, gIven the range of prices, that different margarine brands are not perfect

substitutes

- rcxult inj; In relatively low own price elasticities.

brands will be reflected in the cross-price
elasticities

elasticities.

indicate the degree of substitutability

Relationships

between the

The size of the cross-price

between brands - the larger the cross-

price elasticity the greater the substitutability.
A first order di fferential demand model is used as the functional
elasticity estimation.
empirical

The differential

In addition, the differential

utility theory if consumers'

demand model is consistent

with

utility functions are of the Gorman form. This will be

in detai] in chapter three.

The empirical
theoretical

model has the benefit of being less complex than

demand models more consistent with utility theory, such as the Almost Ideal

Demand System (AIDS).

discussed

form for the

work in this thesis uses a two stage-budgeting

tramcwork.

product categories.

Consumers

model for the

are assumed to initially allocate expenditures

to broad

Products are then chosen based on the prices of only the products

within each broad product group.
Margarine

is divided into two product groups, regular margarine and spread.

There are six brands in the regular category and eight in the spread category.
elasticities

of each brand are estimated as a system for each category,

spread brands are estimated
elasticities

as two separate systems.

for the regular and spread product groups.

The

i.e., the regular and

The next stage estimates
Using two regression

the

equations,

representing the aggregate demand for regular and spread margarine. The final stage is a
demand equation for all margarine.
of the two-stage budget system.

Figure I helps visualize the nested allocation

These stages are represented

in the margarine

process

utility tree

starting with the industry level at the left and moving to the brand level at the right of the

figure.
Figure]
Utility Tree For the Margarine Industry
Brand

Segment

Industry

I Fleischmanns
I

I

I

Regular
Segment

I

I Margarine lndt.xtry

I

Imperial

I

Land 0' Lakes

I

Mazoia

I

Parkay

I

I Private Label

I

Blue Bonnet

I

fI CMB
ICBlNB

I

Parkay Light

I

Promise

I

I

Shedds

I

I

Shedds CC

I

I

Pri vale Label

I

l

I

Spread
I Segment
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The next chapter is a review of the industrial organization
Three focuses on the theory used to specify the empirical
Chapter Four reviews the objectives
some descriptive

statistics.

literature.

Chapter

model used in this thesis.

of the study, discusses the data sources and presents

Chapter Five reports the empirical

Finally, Chapter Six presents the conclusions.

11

results of the analysis.

CHAPTER
LITERA TliRE
The industrial organization
years. The early work comprised

collusion,

REVIEW

literature is extensive,

particularly

for the past forty

mostly structure-conduct-performance

studies examined and tested the relationship
Economists

II

studies.

These

between market structure and profit rate.

believed that higher industry concentration

(few suppliers)

facilitated market

which in turn lead to higheer industry profits.

To test tbis hypothesis,

a measure of concentration

along with several other variables.
the concentration
concentration.

is regressed on industry profit,

A positive, and statistically

measure is interpreted

significant,

relationship

have been concerned

with the structure-performance

Alternative

derived that are anchored to economic

theory by directly estimating

througb rigorously specified empirical

models.

tests of market power have been

This direct approach

market power
is known as the new

(NEIO).

While the NEIO bas made significant
embraced by practitioners

were made that

was wrong.

studies lack of theoretical grounding.

empirical industrial organization

found a positive

existed, although counter-arguments

either thc studies were flawed or the interpretation
Morc recently, economists

for

as evidence that profit increased with industry

For over twenty years tests of this sort predominantly

concenrrution-profit

coefficient

of tbe traditional

inroads, it bas yet to be enthusiastically
methods.
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Direct estimation

of market power

often requires unrealistic assumptions

of market conditions',

arbitrary functional forms. While economists

disagree about methodology,

they seek to answer is the same - are markets operating
Economists

look to perfect competition

measure of efficiency

used by economists

of

the question

efficiently?

for the benchmark

is Pareto efficiency.

efficient if there is no possible change to an allocation
individuals

as well the imposition

for efficiency.

The

An allocation is Pareto

such that an individual

or set of

is made better off without injuring others. The results of the first welfare

theorem indicate that perfectly competitive
then, that the benchmark

for market efficiency
Competitive

The neoclassical

markets will be Pareto efficient.
is perfect competition.
Performance

model of a perfectly competitive

individual buyers purchasing

a homogeneous

It follows

market consists of many

good or service from many suppliers.

The

buyers, each competing with his or her fellow buyer, will tend to bid up the price of the
good. Simultaneously,

the suppliers compete with one another to sell and will tend to bid

the price down. With many equal sized suppliers, the competition
price is driven down to the cost of producing

the good.

to sell is so fierce that

It is not without some irony that

each group's objective, low price for buyers and high price for suppliers, is sabotaged

by

each individual pursuing his or her self interest.
This interaction
taught in introductory

between buyers and sellers is the standard supply and demand
economics

courses.

Market price is determined

when market

; For example many studies have used a Gormon polar form of the cost function,
leads to equal marginal costs across firms.
13

which

supply equals market demand where market supply and demand are the sums of
individual supply and demand curves respectively.

The individual

suppliers, or firms, are

motivated by profit defined as total revenue minus total cost. Total revenue (TR) is
market price multiplied
multiplying

by the quantity sold. Total cost (TC) is determined

by

the quantity sold by the average total cost (ATC) and then adding the fixed

cost of production.

Firms seeking maximum

profit, wil1 produce up to the point that the

marginal cost of production equals the marginal revenue.

More formally, the objective

function or a profit maximizing firm is :
( J )

max

p « '1, - C(q,)

i

=

I, ... .n.

Poq, is the total revenue (TR) firm i receives for selling amount q, . C (TC) is the cost
function firms face when producing.
same for cach finn.

Additional1y,

In this simplified model all cost functions are the
price is also the same across firms so that P is a market

pnce.
The first order condition

(2)

p

=

is :

c".

At the optimal profit level marginal revenue equals market price (P)
and therefore price equals marginal

cost (c').
Interdependence

Industrial organization
perfect competition.

tests the assumption

Often industries

that markets are characterized

by

are dominated by a few large firms (oligopolies)

14

with several fringe firms. The traditional

structure-conduct-performance

models use the basic industrial organization

empirical

paradigm as a guide for research.

This paradigm asserts that in actual markets firms can capitalize by realizing their
interdependence.

If the number of firms is low, the potential exists for individual firms to

stem supply without rivals stepping in to offset the restriction.

The oligopoly restricts

supply to raise market price, which leads to profit. This is a shift from the static first order
condition

of equation (2) to dynamic behavior of strategic decision making.

Inter-industry

interdependence

is modeled in the profit maximizing

writing price as a function of market quantity.
iii' firm's optimization

If there are N homogeneous

problem is:

max P(Q)oq,-c,o(q,J

(3)

Where the first order condition is:
P + (dP/OQ)o(dQldq,J0q,=C,

(4)

which can be rewritten as
P + p(ap I dQ)(QI

(5)
reorganizing

to get the equality
(P-C,)

(6)

PH I + ,1.)5, = C,

P

=

5,0(/+,1.)
E

where
S, = firm i's share of the market
I: =

price elasticity of demand

15

conditions

by

firms then the

P = market price
C·1

::=

. I cost forth
margma
lor tel

.th

furn

Q = total industry quantity
q, = firm i's output.

A = conjectural

variation

The left-hand side of equation (6) is known as both the price-cost

margin and the Lerner

index. The index is a unit free measure of a firm's profits bounded between zero and one;
the former indicating normal profit.
The conjectural

As price exceeds marginal cost, profits are higher.

variation (A) is how firm i believes firrn j will respond to a change in is

Often A is assumed to be zero, mostly for simplicity,

production".

because there is no

easy way to predict firms' reactions to rivals' output decisions.
The relationship
studies.

suggested by (6) is the crux of structure-conduct-performance

In (6) we sec that profitability

is a function of both demand conditions

market structure (S, and A). In the case of monopoly,
competition

(E)

and

S, is equal to one. In perfect

S, is equal to zero because a firm's market share approaches

zero as the

number of firms increases. When S, is zero the Lerner index is also zero - price equals
margi nul cost.
Equation (6) shows that an industry's structure, or concentration,
market price. Although causation

is not clear in equilibrium

conditions,

'This is assumes a Cournot case. In a Bertrand example the conjecture
16

will affect the
it is traditionally

is in prices.

hypothesized

that an increase in industry concentration

will lead to market power and

cause price to exceed marginal cost.

Models that test the concentration-market

relationship

measures for industry concentration.

need to have appropriate

Concentration

Measures

There are several statistical measures of industry concentration.
depends on the availability

power

The best measure

or data and the specific use. Good measures reflect major

structural changes over time, reveal differences in structural power within distinct
markets and firms, and accurately

predict market performance

(Greer,

In an industry with many firms, a single firm may be supplying

1992).
most of the

market, and hence have a high market share. A firm with high market share may exercise
market power even in an industry with many firms. A useful concentration
therefore, needs to account for size differences
For example, the concentration
in the numerator)
distribution.

of the firms.

ratio (CR-N, where N is the number of firms used

attempts to account for both the absolute number of firms and their size

The CR-N is calculated

by finding "the percentage

of total market sales

accounted for by a given number of leading firms (Greer, 1992)."
concentration

ratio (CR4) would be the percent of an industry's

top four firms. Besides providing
concentration

a meaningful

ratio is also easy to understand

The concentration
The concentration

measure,

A four-firm

market share held by the

reflection of the size distribution,

the

(Greer, 1992).

ratio is useful but limited as a measure of industry structure.

ratio does not capture the entire size distribution

adds to the difficulty in comparing

the level of concentration
17

for all firms.

between industries.

This
While

one industry may have a higher CR4, it is possible that another industry has a higher CR2
or CR8.
The concentration
firms in the top category.
concentration

ratio also lacks information

Even if a particular CR4 measure were superior to other

ratios, it would still lack information

firms. Other indexes have been developed
One frequently

about the relative size of individual

about size distributions

of those four

to allow for both size and number of firms.

used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman

(H) index.

summing the squares of firm size, where firm size is represented

It is derived by

as the percentage

of

industry sales. More formally:
(7)

H = 2:(1,;'

Ii = J,2,3"n)

Where s, is firm i :« percent of market share and n is the total number of firms in the
industry.

In a monopoly s; equals 100 percent, the H index is one hundred squared, or

10,000. If the industry is perfectly competitive"
firm has any discernible

and H approaches

zero as no individual

market share. (Greer, 1992) If all firms are of equal size then

H=I/N.
The H index is widely used because it reflects the effects of both finn size and the
number of firms in the market.

By squaring the market share, the impact of larger firms

is given greater weight tban smaller firms. However, the H index is not necessarily

better

than the concentration

and

dependent

ratio. The choice of the concentration

upon the given problem.

Fortunately,

the choice of either H or the CR4.
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few empirical

measure is debatable

studies seem sensitive to

Price-cost

Margin

Early research tcndcd to avoid using market price as a dependent
various reasons.
comparison

The early work was cross-sectional,

of prices between diverse industries.

apple prices to those of jet engines, researchers
price as thc dependent

variable for

which would require the

To avoid the problems of comparing
have typically used profitability

instead of

variable.

The industry price-cost margin is a frequent measure of an industry's
it can be derived from equation (6). Rewriting

(6) into an industry's

profitability;

price cost margin

form:
(P-MC)IP=-

(8)

H
E

Here

Me

is the industry's weighted average of firms' marginal costs. The variable H is

the Herfindahl-Hirschman
p.2(0).

concentration

index from equation (7) (Scherer and Ross, 1990

The left-hand side of equation (8) is the industry's price-cost

more concentrated
therefore,

The

the industry, the higher H and in turn the higher the PCM. The PCM,

is a positive function of the industry's concentration

A market power explanation
industries with high concentration

as the Differential

(H).

for this positive relationship

is that firms in

can collude, or follow a dominant firm, ensuring

higher profits (Clarke, Davies, and Waterson,
Schmalensee

margin (PCM).

Collusion

]984).

Hypothesis

This argument is presented
(DCH):

"Industries differ in the effectiveness with which sellers are able to limit
competition by tacit or explicit collusion. Collusion is more likely to be
effective, and profitability is more likely to be above competitive levels,
the higher the seller concentration (Schmalensee, ]987)."
t9

by

Through collusion
price.

(explicit or tacit) oligopolistic

By increasing price, the collusive

firms exercise

firms can extract economic

price rises above ATC. This has led researchers
concentration

market power by raising

to examine

profits as market

the effect of industry

on profits.
Profit and Concentration

The early empirical work testing the concentration-performance
mainly the work of Bain and his followers,
significantly

larger in manufacturing

the concentration

ratio is positively

was

Bain found that the average profit rate was

industries

of 70 or greater compared to industries

hypotheses

with eight-firm

concentration

ratios (CR8)

with a CR8 below that level, Bain also found that

related to industry profitability.

Since then there have

been hundreds of studies that have yielded similar conclusions

(Scherer and Ross, 1990 p.

41 I). Pelzman was so impressed by the accumulated

that he concluded

that

"I w Jith few exceptions, market concentration

correlated

(Clarke, Davis, and Waterson,

evidence

and industry profitability

in 1977

are positively

1984)."

Recent studies have shown that these previous results may have been spurious.
This was caused by aggregating
and profitability
concentration

"a positive relationship

between sellers' market shares

to the industry level." (Scherer and Ross, 1990 pAIl)

Instead of

leading to higher profits, it is the larger market share that affects profits.

To account for this, studies started to look at firms' market shares as a cause of positive
economic

profits.

This refinement

was not possible earlier due the lack of detailed firm

data.

20

Profit and Market Share
The availability
the importance

of detailed business

line data has enabled researchers

of market share. The Federal Trade Commission's

program is one example of a data set that provided disaggregated
level.

to confirm

Line of Business
data at the business

Using this data set, studies have found that when holding market share constant,

concentration

(CR4) , in general, does not have a positive effect on profits.

Concentration

has even been found to have a negative effect on profitability

share was also included in the model (Ravenscraft,
Further evidence is found in Montgomery's
diversification.

Montgomery

1983).
study of product-market

(J985) included several explanatory

including market share. concentration,
measure of a finn's profitability).

variables in her model,

and a returns-on-invested-capita)

In criticizing

when market

variable (a

the theory that diversified

firms attain

higher profits, she provides results that support the market share argument of market
power. Specifically,

market share had a significant

whereas the estimated coefficient

and positive estimated coefficient,

of CR4 was not significant.

(Montgomery,

1985)

Because of the varied results found in studies of market share's effects on profit,
Szymanski,

Bharadwa], and Yaradarajan

seventy such studies.

a meta-analysis

They found that, on average, market share is positively

with business profitability.
specification

(1993) performed

However

they caution that the relationship

errors, sample characteristics,

and measurement

Although market share appears positively correlated
of the effect may be less than originally

thought.
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on over
correlated

is moderated

by

characteristics.
with profits, the magnitude

It had been assumed that a one-percent

change in market share led to a half-percent change in profits. However, changes in
profit may be closer to a one-tenth percent change for a one-percent change in market
share (Aaker and Jacobson, 1985). Further work is needed to reach general conclusions,
if any exist, regarding the actual magnitude of the relationship.
Profit, Concentration, and Market Share
It is possible that both concentration and market share can have a positive effect

on profits. While concentration increases the industry's price level, i.e., all firms receive
higher profits, high firm market share allows firms to receive higher individual profits.
Concentrated industries would have higher profit levels than non-concentrated industries,
and high market share firms would have higher profits than low market share firms.
This has been supported by several studies including Ravenscraft (1983). In the
Ravenscraft study, both market share ( which should capture the greater efficiency or
"luck" of leading firms) and industry concentration (a proxy for the potential to collude)
had a positive and significant effect on profits (Connor, et al., 1985). Many researchers
(for a review see Connor, et al.) combine measures of CR4 and market share to create a
relative firm market share variable. This variable captures both the contributions of CR4
and market share without the multi-collinearity problems of using the two correlated
measures.

Rents
Much of this work has been used to provide clues as to the existence and degree
of market power within an industry. Profit can increase, however, without price increases
caused by market power. The left-hand side of equation (5), (P-MC)/P, is made up of
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both price and marginal cost. It is possible

that prices increase, which would support the

claims or market power, or that MC has decreased,

suggesting

argument. Efficiency arguments are based on the assumption

an efficiency-based
that certain firms have

lower cuxts (due to size or a unique factor) than their rivals.
Positive profits are not necessarily
economics

of scale in the industry or by a unique input.

called rents.
efficiency

due to market power.

Rents are either Ricardian

or by supply restriction,

or monopolistic

They can be caused by

These profits are sometimes
and are generated either by

respectively.

Economic profits that result from lower average total cost (ATC), which are not
the result of monopsony

power, are known as Ricardian

rents. The positive profit is a

reflection of the higher value of the low ATC firm's inputs.
greater rclati ve efficiency for the firm possessing

it.

For example, a particular farm may have exceptionally
produce at a lower cost than other farms.

The unique input leads to

fertile land. This farm can

Because the market price of an homogenous

industry is equal the cost of the marginal supplier (highest cost) the price of the
agricullural

commodity

will be above the fertile farm's cost. This gives the fertile farm

positive profits on the sale of its produce. The discounted
will equal the current stock value of the difference

flow of extra profit received

between the fertile plot of land and the

lower quality land; if not, the fertile land will be sold to invest the price premium
elsewhere.

The Ricardian rent will therefore equal the opportunity

the scarce input.
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cost of holding on to

[I' the unique input is such that it prevents

the market is a natural monopoly.

For example,

others from entering the market, then
assume that there is a single mine for a

particular ore. The mine would be able to completely
entry of new suppliers is impossible.

control market supply because

The flow of profit received from the mine over

time, while still equal to its stock value, is based on supply restriction,
Imperfect competition

can also result from economies

(EOS) simply means that as all elements

of production

output will increase by some larger factor.
there are such high fixed costs to produce,
The industry becomes concentrated
competitors

not to efficiency.

of scale.

Economy of scale

are increased by some factor,

A good example

is the auto industry.

Because

auto firms are more efficient with greater size.

as the larger firms, with low A TC, price the smaller

out of the market.

Therc is much debate in the literature
scale receive Ricardian rents or monopoly

if industries characterized

rents.

Of course, monopoly

by economies

of

rents associated

with industries with EOS would not be an issue if firms could enter freely as assumed by
the basic neoclassical

model.

This assumption
considering

of the neoclassical

the above discussion

and-run entry of a contestable
prevented.

model of free entry is questionable

of the auto industry.

market, the corrective

Without entry, or the threat of hiteffect of entering firms on price is

[f entry barriers are coupled with concentrated

potential for market failure is high.
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industries

(few firms), the

Concentration

of an industry could come about through competition

cost advantage due to scale economies
curves (Demsctz,

or through shifts in positively

1972). The Differential

Efficiency

Hypotheses

if there is a

sloped marginal cost

(DEH) states that:

"Effective Collusion is rare or nonexistent.
In some industries, long-lived
efficiency differences are unimportant, and both concentration and
accounting profitability are generally low. Where efficiency differences
are important, efficient firms obtain large market shares and earn rents,
and both concentration and industry-level profitability are thus high
(Schrnalcnsce, 1987)."
Dernserz bclicvc-, that some industries are concentrated because large firms are more

efficient.

From this argument, concentration

efficiency,

and not from collusion.

traditional

market power explanation

and profitability

However,

"evidence

...

are correlated,

but it is from

is more sympathetic

of profitability-concentration

industry level than it is to DEH" (Clarke, Davies, and Waterson,

correlation

theory points to increased

Bertrand and Chamberlin's

profit with higher industry concentration.

theories do not predict higher profits.

not predict higher prices, Chamberlin's

ambiguity

Not all
Both

While Bertrand does

large numbers case predicts that in oligopoly

profits will disappear while high prices remain.
inefficiencies

at the

1984).

Dcmscrz does, however, put into question the nature of profit studies.
oligopoly

to the

There is also the possibility

eating away at excess profits in oligopolistic

of X-

markets (Weiss, 1989). This

in theory makes it difficult to formulate empirical tests of market structure-

profit relationships.
Another problem with profit studies is difficulty in measurement.
well-defined

economic concepts

are very difficult to measure empirically.
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Frequently,
The literature

is filled with various studies testing profit determinants without a common measure.
Weiss (1989) outlines a host of measurement biases that occur within these studies. An
approach that circumvents some of these problems is the price-market structure model.
This literature is reviewed in the next section.
Price and Market Structure
Price-market structure models provide a more direct means to study the market
power question (Connor, et aI., 1985). By using a price model, the criticisms of Demsetz
can be circumvented; the effect of concentration and market share on price can be
associated with market power instead of greater efficiency. Note that high prices may be
a goal, but that they should not remain after "the adjustment is complete in competition."
(Weiss, 1989) In the long run, entry by new firms will drive price back toward minimum
ATC
In practice, it is very difficult to ascertain marginal costs. This is due in part to
firms' reluctance in reporting sensitive cost data. To avoid the problem of missing cost
data, a proxy for MC is often used instead. For many products sold in large
supermarkets, there are both branded products and the retail store's version of the product
called a private label. Private labels' prices are assumed to approximate the competitive
price and therefore marginal cost for all firms (Connor and Peterson, J 992). Where
private labels exist they are used as the proxy for MC
There are three basic types of price-market structure studies. The first is the
Price-Concentration model that models price as a function of industry concentration.

The

second is the Price-Market Share model where increased market share is postulated to
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raise price. The third type is a combination of the first two. with price as a function of
both industry concentration

and market share.
Price and Concentration

Many models have been designed
price.

10

test the effects of industry conccntr.uion on

These models are similar to the profit-concentration

studies but instead

usc

price

as the dependent variable instead of profit. Price models also diller in Ihal they tend

10

look at singlc industries with virtually homogeneous products. to avoid incompuruhlc
marker

prices (Weiss, 1989).
In a study of local cement markets, Koller and Weiss rested ihc basic hypothcsis

that seller concentration
concentration

is positively correlated with price levels. They found thai

was statistically significant for each of the seven years of dala. In all but

two of the years there was a positive relationship between concentration and price (Weiss.
1989).
In another study by Parker and Connor. narioual-brund and private-label rct.ul
price differences were regressed against CR4. CR4'. two advertising variables. and five
control variables.
variables,

Their results yielded statistically significant rcxultx for all structural

with a positive regression coefficient

for the concentration

variable (Connor. ~

al., 1985).

To avoid the problems of price comparisons over distinct markets. Kelton and
Weiss developed a simultaneous equations model to test the relationship between change
in concentration

and change in price.

By examining changes in price and concentration

they could present more general results. They concluded thai "rising concentration doc.,
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lead to long term price changes." They note that the relationship is stronger for consumer
goods than capital goods (Weiss, 1989).
Differentiation and Branding
Fln11Sare able to charge different prices for goods if the products are in some way
different from other products in the industry. When an industry is made up of
functionally similar but slightly different products it is said to be differentiated. These
distinctions are based on either real or perceived quality differences and image of the
brands.
Finns try to differentiate themselves from their competitors through branding. A
branded product is endowed with physical and implied attributes, often created and
maintained by advertising. These attributes are both functional evaluations and emotional
connections.
Marketing is used to bond the consumers with a particular brand. Marketers
aucmpt to convince the consumer that the brand is functionally superior and/or socially
superior to other brands in the industry. Brand loyalty develops as the consumer begins
identifying with the brand. Firms attempt to identify their brand with certain
characteristics that appeal to the consumer. Those skeptical of price effects due to brand
image need only look at the prices of bottled water to be convinced. It is not uncommon
for some branded water to sell at twice the price of the lowest priced competitor.
Conspicuous consumers are not the only ones influenced by branding. For
example, Jell-O brand gelatin is chemically identical to other gelatins yet sells at a
substantially higher price over its nearest rival, Royal gelatin. Jell-O sells its gelatin with
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all of the implied attributes of the Jell-O brand: wholesomeness, family fun, and the
actor/comedian Bill Cosby as their spokesperson.
It is essential that the brand name be distinguished from the product. The product
IS

the physical good (gelatin, water, margarine) and the brand is a conceptual set of

attributes. Successful brands (Jell-O or Parkay) rarely have any product reference in their
names, which allows for expansion or movement of the brand into other industries.
Regardless of how the product is differentiated the effects are higher prices.
Higher prices are maintained because product differentiation serves as a type of "micro"
barrier to entry. For example, the more consumers who view Coke and Pepsi as different
products (low substitutes), the higher these firms can raise their own cola prices.
Price and Market Share
The price-market share model attempts to account for the effects of product
differentiation on prices by allowing multiple prices to exist within an industry. In most
concentration models a single price is used for the entire market and necessitate many
local markets to create a cross-sectional dataset - rarely are goods sold at one price in
multi-finn markets. Models that incorporate the effects of market share in differentiated
industries avoid averaging out the effects of market share on price.
Most of the price studies by Weiss, unfortunately, have not included market share
as an independent variable. However, a paper by Wills did study the effects of market
share on price. In his study of food markets, Wills looked at "the prices of individual
brands, private labels, and generic labels for 145 very specific categories ... "This
approach removed many of the price differences due to unequal quality levels. The results
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of the study showed that national market share was positively
(Connor et aI., 1985). Many price-market
fire for not having an explicit theoretical
criticism

related to brand retail price

share studies, such as Wills, have come under
base for the empirical

models.

Tbis has lead to

thai the work has been "data mined" for results or that results represent

correlations rather than causation.

To counter the opponents
theoretically

derived model of differentiated

profit maximization

(9)

of this work, Haller (1994) laid out in detail a
products.

The derivation

starts with the

problem of firm i where

n, = (p, - AVC,)-q,

- FC,

is the finn's profit function where:
11:,

= firm i\ profit

p,

= finn i's price

A VC,

= average variable cost for firm i

q,

= finn i's quantity

FC',

= fixed cost for firm i.

Through manipulation

of the first order conditions,

firm i's price determined

} -

I,

-

form of

by cost, elasticity of demand, and market share. In the simple

Bertrand (zero-conjectures)

( 10)

Haller arrives at a functional

case the above relationship

Me
I

[1-s1]/'7/11
l

where:
p, = firm i's price
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reduces to

Mel
Sj:=

:=

firm i's marginal cost

firm i's market share

11'''=market price elasticity of demand.
Haller points out that even if all firms have identical marginal costs, prices can
still vary due to differences in market share. This is in direct opposition to the Demsetz
differential efficiency view. Demsetz argues that all price differences are due to

COSI

differentials between firms. Haller's work shows that this explanation of differing prices
overlooks the effects of market share on price.
Haller tested his theory of market power with empirical models using cottage
cheese and catsup sales data from sixty-five retail markets in the U.S .. Average price per
pound was regressed against several independent variables, including volume market
share. There was clear evidence of a positive relationship between market share and
puce. This relationship, however, "is an inter-brand rather than an intra-brand
relationship." The brands with higher market shares had higher prices but to increase
share firms needed to lower price.
The above relationship was tested with investor owned firms (lOF) and
agricultural cooperatives. Haller compared the results of the catsup industry where no
significant cooperatives operate with the cottage cheese industry, with many significant
cooperatives to test for differences between cooperatives and IOFs. He found that
cooperatives differ from their IOF counterparts.

In the cottage cheese industry, brands marketed by cooperatives
positive market share-price
as strong a relationship

relationship

Haller noted above.

as the IOFs. The relationship

do have the

They do not, however, have

was one third to one half that of

brands not marketed by cooperatives.

Even more significantly

to affect prices of all brands.

sold in markets where co-ops compete sell for

"Brands

is that cooperatives

seem

three to eight cents less than they would were the co-ops not there." From rhis Haller
concludes that "cooperatives

should be encouraged

to enter or expand their presence in

branded products markets."
In another study of cooperatives,

Andonov (1996) estimated

to Haller's, for the margarine industry.
of physical product homogeneity,
among brands.

a price model, similar

This industry was selected due to its high degree

which served to reduce the degree of quality differences

The data set consisted

of quarterly,

There were over six thousand observations

retail margarine

price data from 1992.

gathered from about sixty retail markets

across the United States.
Private-label
gcographical

price was included

retail markets (Andonov,

that if private-label
the competitive

1996). Connor and Peterson (1992) have argued

firms operate in a market then their prices should be a good proxy for

price (and hence MC) in the industry since the private-label

minimal barriers to entry.
differences

in the model to control for varying costs by

Therefore,

private-label

price is used to control for price

related to different costs in these geographic

approximately

segment has

markets.

For each of the

sixty retail markets used there is only an average price for all private-labels

in each regional market - this variable is meant to capture general cost differences
32

among

the retail markets.

For example, many large cities have high labor costs that put upward

pressure on all the products sold in the market, including margarine.
Andonov'<
significant

results were strikingly

effect of cooperatives

positive price share relationship
regression

coefficient

support the differential

different from Haller's.

on the market price levels, and he failed to find the
found in Haller's

work.

of -.11, and was highly significant.
efficiency

hypothesis

producers with lower prices, however,

Market share had an estimated
Andonov's

that larger-share

once advertising

leading brands with the highest advertising
their market share or advertising

Andonov did not find a

result seems to

finns are lower-cost

expenditures

were accounted

for

had the highest prices and increased as either

increased.
Advertising

As stated earlier, firms will try to differentiate
non-price competition
advertising.

their product from rivals. This

is achieved hy slight alterations

It is difficult to distinguish

the perceived quality differences

of the product and/or heavy

between the price effects of superior quality and

caused by advertising.

Advertising

serves both to

educate the consumer about actual product attributes and to influence consumers'
perceptions.
Wills' (1983 a) study of fifty processed
separating these two effects.
compare quality differences
concluded

foods attempted the difficult task of

Wills used Consumer
among the products.

Reports for quality evaluations

By holding quality constant, he

that brand prices were a positive function of advertising.
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to

His results would

suggest that advertising

does affect consumers'

beliefs regarding

product quality (Connor

etal.,1985).
Advertising
performance
advertising

expenditures

should be included in most models of market

for branded products.

However,

an econometric

is included in models along with market share, at least in consumer

The results of many studies show that advertising
consumer
advertising.

problem may arise when

markets.

related with profit in

Jacobson and Aaker (1985) also show that market share is related to

This suggests the possibility

share and advertising

is significantly

markets.

of collinearity

serve as explanatory

in models where both market

variables for profit, and by similar reasoning,

for price.
Price, Market Share, and Concentration
As with the profit models, both concentration
positive effect on prices.
than non-concentrated

Concentrated

industries.

industries

Accordingly,

and market share may have a

are expected to have higher price levels

high market-share

firms are hypothesized

to have higher prices than low market share firms.
In one such study, Marion et al. examined

price levels by retail grocery stores for

a market basket of 94 comparable

products across varying retail market structures.

Measures for retail concentration

and market share or relative market share (RMS) was

used. RMS was derived by dividing CR4 by a firm's market share. The market basket
price was regressed on these variables
The authors found that the estimated

along with several other explanatory
coefficients

share measures were positive and statistically

for concentration

significant (Weiss,
34

variables.

and for both market
1989).

In a similar study, Cotterill

performed

a price analysis of the same 94 products in

the Marion report and added frozen, dairy and health products (Weiss, 1989). While the
basic structure of the study was the same, most of the explanatory
different.

Included was a measure for concentration

share or RMS. Cotterill ran two regressions
concentration

variables were

and a measure for either market

with both concentration

measured by CR2 or CR 1. These concentration

and RMS, with

ratios based on either the

leading firm or top two firms were used because the markets being studied were much
smaller than the markets in the Marion study.
measure for concentration,
two coefficients.
significant

The first regression

and yielded statistically

significant

used CR2 as the

positive estimates for the

The second estimate equation used CR I, and only concentration

- not surprising given that CRI is the leader's

The above studies provide evidence,
positive function of market concentration,

market share.

albeit tenuous, to support that price is a

market share, and advertising

levels. The

notion warrants further research beyond that done on the more conventional
conduct-performance

was

structure-

relationships,
Market Share and Price

Most of the studies that look at market-share
assumption

about the causal flow. SpecificaJIy,

function of market share. However,

price relationships

make an implicit

they assume that price is a positive

market share can be written as a function of price, by

reversing the causality relationship.
The study by Aaker and Jacobson
looked at market share as the dependent

is one of the few traditional
variable.
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The study separated

10 studies that
the data into four

categories:

All Business, Consumer

Goods, Capital Goods, and Supply Goods.

share was written as a function of several variables, including
market share and a measure of relative price.
for all categories
negatively

except Capital Goods.

correlated

Relative price was statistically

cases, relative price was

1985). New empirical

(NEIO) studies also use share as the dependent

that the key to understanding

significant

This would suggest that higher relative prices

lead to lower market share (Aaker and Jacobson,
organization

two lagged measures of

In all of the significant

with market share.

Market

variable.

industrial
The NErO argues

market power is in the demand structure that each firm faces

when selling its products.
New Empirical
In 1982 Appelbaum

Industrial Organization

laid the foundation

that used a system of equations

for the NErO by outlining a procedure

to estimate market structure.

provided a structure to estimate directly the conjectural
margins could be estimated.

Unfortunately

Specifically,

variation (A) so that price-cost

this approach assumes constant marginal cost

across Industries and hence is unable to answer the efficiency
Baker and Bresnahan

curves associated

argument.

(1985), while following Appelbaum's

approach to market power, introduced

Appelbaum

competitive

demand analysis

analysis based on the residual demand

with a given firm. Cotterill (1993 p.1 I) states:

'The residual demand and the market structure-price

approach

cost efficiency critique when testing for market power.

Residual demand

analysts estimate the residual demand curves for an individual
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avoid the

product

(business unit) and discover whether the residual demand cure has nonzero
(negative)
A negative slope

slope."

or the

residual demand curve indicates

market power.

The analysis applied the residual demand method to the beer industry where
residual demand elasticities
were estimated.

for beer products

By simulating

sold by Anheuser-bush,

mergers, Baker and Baresnahan

Coors, and Miller

tested the assumption

there would be an increase of market power. This was done by estimating
and cross price elasticities
limiting assumptions

of demand from the residual demand curves.

that

both own price
By making

about supply they could estimate residual demand elasticities and

show the increase of market power based on simulated

mergers between the above firms.

The measure of market power used was the observed price elasticity of demand - a
function of demand elasticity (own and cross) and price reaction elasticities,

the percent

changc in price by a firm given a price change of a rival. The general form of the
observed elasticity is given as:
N

( I I)

1)'/

=

/7/1

+

L

1)/, E"

2=1

where:
11'" = the residual price elasticity of demand
1111

= the non-fellowship

11I;

= the

CjJ

= the price response elasticity of rival i.

cross-price

or unilateral price elasticity of demand

elasticity of demand
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The residual demand elasticity is estimated
estimate

directly from the residual demand curve.

This

is inverted and is equated to the price markup; this holds exactly when the firms

are in a constant conjecture equilibrium.

(Baker and Baresnahan,

Hausman et al. present a less limiting approach
I')')4 paper by estimating
analyzed,
clasticiucs.
simulate

The elasticities

to demand estimation

the own and cross price elasticities.

this time using a multistage

budgeting

1985)
in their

The beer industry is again

model to estimate the demand

are then used in a competitive

analysis of the beer industry to

the market power effects of mergers between brands.
To generate the elasticities

top tier corresponds

Hausman

first set up a three-tier demand system.

The

to the total demand for the product (beer). The middle level estimates

the demand for beer in each segment of the industry; the industry is broken into light,
popular,
within

and premium beers. At the bottom level are the demand equations for brands
each segment.

Once these elasticities

are estimated

it is possible to forecast the change in price of

a given brand after a merger. The form derived is
I

( 12)

- I

where:
(X,

= the percentage price increase of each merging product

E,i

= the

own-price

e/," = the

elasticity of demand for brand j

post-merger

markup

3X

The authors "calculate

a hypothetical

segment, Coors and Labatts.
price following

merger between

two brands in the premium

. ,. from the above equation.

a merger between the two brands depends

other brands in the industry.

The simulation

They find that the increase in
on the constraining

effects of

yielded a wide range of price increases

ranging from 4.4% to 108.3% for Coors and 3.3% to 104.8% for Labatts (costs were held
constant).
Adding to Hausman et aI., Cotterill (1994) attempts
a particular
estimated

brand given the change in a rival's price.

to unveil the price change of

A system of demand equations is

with price reaction functions to uncover both the elasticities

of demand and

price reaction elasticities.
To derive the price reaction function, Cotterill
equation

an empirical demand

into the firm's profit equation for q,; the reaction function can be uncovered

differentiating
price.

substitutes

by

the profit equation with respect to the firm's price and then solving for

Cotterill has shown that this approach

functions that can be used in estimating

will yield estimates

for price reaction

the observed demand elasticities

in Baker and

Baresnahan.
While Cotterill's approach to estimating
unrestricted
derive.

estimates, the functional

the price reaction elasticities

leads to

form of the price reaction function is difficult to

The revenue portion of the profit equation used to generate the reaction functions

is easily defined but the cost portion is not. This makes it difficult to
terms of only the parameters

of the model and rivals' prices.

solve for price in

Another elasticity paper by Haung and Hahn estimates
agricultural

segments.

estimate the elasticities

An interesting

meat elasticities for several

feature of this paper is the functional forms used to

- a first order differential

form is used in this thesis to estimate margarine
Haung and Hahn model and the two-stage

demand function.
elasticities.

budgeting
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This same functional

The next chapter outlines the

frame work used in this paper.

CHAPTER
DEMAND
In a study of price elasticities
differential
derivation

approximation

III

THEORY

of demand, Huang and Hahn (J 994) use a first order

of the general Marshallian

of the differential

demand model is completely

restrictions

on the demand structure. In the following

restrictions

should be imposed to aggregate

model is then re-derived considering

budget

section we will see that certain
and consumers.

from Huang and Hahn (1994). The

The consumer's

maximization

utility function is maximized

problem facing
subject to a linear

5

constraint .

More formally:
( I 3)

max L
'f,

A

=

U( q)

The

these restrictions.

demand curve is derived from the constrained

the individual consumer.

general and imposes no

across commodities

The following COmes almost exclusively

Marshallian

demand curves for meat. The

- 11.( p « q - M )

where:
Urq)

= the utility function

A

= the Lagrangian

multiplier

p

= an n-coordinate

row vector of prices

q

= an n-coordinare

coJumn vector of quantities

M

= consumer expenditure

(marginal

utility of income)

(inner product of p and q)

"The budget constraint need not be linear. See Deaton and Muellbauer
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1980.

Differentiating

the above yields

(14)

U, ( '1) = /l, e 1', ' V i = 1, 2, ." n

and
(15)

peq=M.

Solving these equations simultaneously
'1, = g, (I', M),

( 16)

Vi

gives
= 1,2, ... ,n

which is the ordinary demand system in its most general form.
The first order differential
conceptual

demand equation.

approximation

imposes no explicit structure on the

Taking the total derivative

of the general demand function

yields
(17 )
"This demand system is quite general in relating ... small changes from any given point
on the n-cornrnodity

surface." (Huang and Hahn, 1994)

It is a simple matter to rewrite (17) in terms of elasticities.
and second terms of the right-hand

side of (17) by P, /p, and M/M respectively,

dq, M
--dM
dM M

( 18)

which is then divided by q, to obtain

( 19)

Multiplying

dq,
'1,
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the first
yields

where the terms in parenthesis

are the price and income elasticities,

respectively.

This

can be rewritten as

d I' I +

dq,

(20)

__

'I,

I , 2,

[ ,j

,11

I' ,

where E" equals the price elasticity of demand (own and cross price) and 11,equals the
income elasticity of demand for good i.
There are several constraints
consistency

that Huang and Hahn impose on (20) to insure

with classical demand theory of the consumer.

Engel Aggregation:

These are as follows:

L, w, 11;= 1

:1, E" + 11,= 0

Homogeneity

Symmetry: E,/W, + 11,= Ej,iw, + 11.i
Negativity:

£1\

+ wIllI < 0

where w, is the budget share of the ith good. The budget share is the proportion
expenditure

for good i, (p, -q,)/M.

The next section explores

model market demand in this fashion.
the price elasticirv for the differential
Separability

of total

when it is appropriate

Based on this discussion

to

the correct structure of

model will be derived.
and Two-Stage

Budgeting

As discussed at the close of the previous chapter, Huang and Hahn (1994) present
a very useful model, although it is not appropriate

in all situations.

the utility structure that allows for the correct application
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This section outlines

of the differential

demand

model.

The following section will derive the general form of the price and income

elasticities

for the appropriate

utility structure.

The advantage of the two-stage
the number of parameters

budgeting

approach

that need to be estimated.

the researcher

the most relevant brands or markets from estimation.

comparisons,

The general demand function specifies
function of the prices of all goods available

unlikely brand level consumer

television

and a Snapple iced tea.

the demand of any single good as a

(now and in the future).

prices of all goods, however, both present and inter-temporally,
Fortunately,

can eliminate all but

Demand at each level is conditional

for that level. This eliminates

e.g .. deciding between a Magnavox

reduces

Instead of modeling demand as a

function 01 price" from all products in the economy,

on the allocated expenditure

is that it significantly

Accounting

for the

is impossible.

it is possible to model demand as a series of partial maximization

problems.

For example. the demand for "food" can be found without knowing the distribution
individual

food products. (Varian,

1992 1'.147)

Consider the case where there are two "subbundles,l,
bundle is (x, z) and the price vector is (I', g). The consumer's
be rewritten as

(21 )

max U(X.

x:

z)

of

such that PX + q:

'term from Varian, 1992.
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In

so that the consumption
maximization

problem can

where P and X are indexes that are functions

of individual

prices and quantities, such

that:
P = I' (p) and X = I' (x).
These indexes are some average price and quantity for the aggregate
Aggregation

commodity bundle.

of this type is possible only if there is either Hicksian or functional

separa)ll '1'uy 7 .
Functional
"commodities
described

separability

indicates that there is separability

can be partitioned

independently

1980) This is equivalent

into groups so that preferences

of the quantities

of other groups."

such that

within groups can be

(Deaton and Muellbauer,

to saying that there is a subutility

group and that total utility is a combination

of preferences

function for each commodity

of the subutilities.

"[T[he utility function can

he written as
(22)
where f (0) is some increasing function and
associated

with food, shelter, and entertainment,

1980) It is possible that each subutility
functions.

Vf,

v; and

Vo

are the subutility functions

respectively."

function is itself comprised

The utility tree in Figure 2 shows the hierarchical

functions.

"Only functional separability

(Deaton and Muellbauer,

will he addressed.
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of further subutility

nature of nested subutility

Figure 2
Utility Tree: Commodity Groups and Separability

----I

Cereal

Food
Vegerables

-----1

Housing

Shelter
Fuel

Theater

Entertainment I------j
'------\

Music

Two-stage budgeting can be seen as a natural extension of the utility tree. Total
expenditure is first allocated across the aggrcgate groups (food, shelter, and
entertainment). Then the consumer maximizes the subutility function for each specific
good conditioned on group expenditure. "In order to have a budget constraint that is
linear in quantity index, we need to assume ... the subutility function is homothetic."
(Varian, 1992 p.ISI)
The intuition behind a multi-stage budget demand system is that consumers make
purchasing decisions hierarchically. Purchasing decisions are first made at the industry
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level. Once the industry is selected, the consumer
segment from which to purchase.
remaining

brands.

then selects the appropriate

Finally the consumer

market

chooses the brand from the

Consider an example of an automobile

purchase.

The consumer first

decides to buy a car (industry), then decides the type (market segment) and then chooses
which car to buy from that segment (brand).
both aggregation

"Note that two-stage

(to construct the broad groups) and separable

of the group sub-problems)."

(Deaton and Muellbauer,

While related, separability
needs stronger conditions

decision making (for each

budgeting.

for an exact solution8

however, necessary and sufficient for the second stage of two-stage
and Muellbauer,

The first stage
Separability

budgeting.

is,

(Deaton

1980)
Aggregation

When modeling market demand,
inclividualutility

maximization

specific situations.
homogeneity

involves

1980)

does not imply two-stage

than weak separability

budgeting

problem.

Across Consumers
it is tempting to treat aggregate behavior as an
Unfortunately,

this is appropriate

Aggregate demand will hold "no interesting

and continuity."

Hence "the theory of the consumer

aggregate behavior. ... " (Varian,

J

only in very

properties other than
places no restrictions

992 p.IS3)

It is possible, however, to model aggregate

behavior

as if it were generated

Market demand will appear to be generated

by a

representative

consumer.

maximization

if all individuals are assumed to have an indirect utility function with the

"See Deaton and Muellbauer,

1980.
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by utility

on

Gorrnon form:
(23)

= ",(1') + h(p)m,

V,(/),III,)

Notice Iha' the b (p) term is independent

of i and is therefore

When income enters the utility function

linearly as above, the marginal propensity to

spend is identical for all consumers.

identical for all consumers.

The demand function derived from the Gorman

utility function clearly shows this result.
Using Roy's identity we find that the demand function for good j for individual
'1,'(1',111,)

(24 )

=

i is

al ip) + fJl(p)l11i

where:

a/(p)

=

d a;(p)
dp I
hlp)

and

diJ(pj
fJl (1')

=

dp

I

hlp)

q,' with respect to m, yields b', which is independent

Differentiating

can conclude that the marginal propensity
of any consumer
consumers."

to spend is "independent

and also constant across consumers

(Varian,

of i. From this we
of the level of income

since b (p) is constant across

1992 p. 153)

The aggregate demand function can be found by summing the above demand
function across all consumers

so that

48

ab(p)

aalp)

Q'II'.m', ... ni")

The associated

indirect utility function of

(26)

VII'. M)

where Lm, = M (Varian,

=

a 1',

""

(25)

=

£"',=1

hi p}

hlp)

=

A(p) + B(p)M,

1992 p.IS3).

The Gormon form can be shown to be both sufficient
representative

consumer

-

Q' can be shown to be

+ h(p)M

I;=,a,(p)

ap

I,JI
+ --£"',_/,n,

model to be valid.

Considering

and Hahn model to determine when it is consistent

and necessary for the

this, We must revisit the Haung

with the Gorman

Huang and Hahn report that their first order differential

approximation

is derived from a demand curve with an unknown utility structure.
Hahn are modeling market demand with theoretical
function is derivable from a utility function.
use of restrictions
By substituting

Following

of demand

However, Huang and

implying that the demand

from the above discussion, the

in an aggregate demand model requires the use of the Gorman form.

the Gorman indirect utility function for the general function used by

Huang and Hahn we can determine
impose restrictions

what the structure of the differential

on market demand.

Rewriting the representative

consumer

aa,(p)

aI',

model
ah(1' )

--(27)

restrictions,

form,

ap

+ -

MI' )

49

Mp)

,
m,

model must be to

Then taking the total derivative

as indicated

by Huang and Hahn

if (/!.J'l

JOdP}
--

JI',,)j',

aI',

+ 2
hll' J

+
b(pt

[

db(p)
--111/

1

o»,

"

]

ah(I'J
--

o»,

I
CPA

+

l

db(I'}

1

dl'

dM

--I

17(1' )

and rewriting to gel

a' ([,(1')

d

a p,

a",ap,

q/

ab(p)

ab(p)

-----

)--

b(p)

hlp)

dp, +

a P,
hlp)

dM

we see that

aq,'
() 1',

=

I

a'a,lp}
apia",

+

a' btp}
a",a",

ab(p)
l11r

b(p)

l

+ 2( 'I,'

)

~
hIP)

and
()h( p)
() " I

b(p)

The marginal propensity to spend is clearly independent
derivativc.

These derivatives

show that the differential

with utility theory if all individuals

of i in the above partial
demand structure is consistent

are assumed to have a utility structure of the Gorman

form.
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Much of the empirical work in this paper blends the procedures
Hausman et 'II. (1994) and Huang and Hahn, (1994).
to estimate elasncitie«
demand equations
The coefficients
conditioned

'II

each level within the model.

A two-stage

budget model is used

The functional

at each level are first order differentials

forms for the

of general demand functions.

of the demand functions at each level are conditional

on the expenditure

outlined by

elasticities -

allocated to that level. While not calculated

possiblc to combine the elasticities

at each level to construct

'Hausman et. al (1994) calculate the unconditional
elasticities estimated with an AIDS model.
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elasticities

unconditional

here, it is
elasticities"'

from the conditional

CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL MODEL
In the last chapter a theoretical

model for a demand

laid out. This chapter will present the empirical
estimation

procedure.

description

form of these equations

followed by a

of the variables and their data sources.
is conditional

on consumer

on the next highest level. In this study the brand level demand system is

conditional

on segment level expenditures.

conditional

on total expenditures

demand elasticities
expenditure.

used in the

The demand system for each stage will be presented,

Each stage ,,1' the model, except for the industry,
expenditures

model in elasticity form was

In turn, the demand at the segment level is

for the industry.

are conditional;

Therefore,

the demand is conditioned

It is only after industry demand is estimated

can he transformed

into unconditional

The empirical

functional

regular margarines

will be explicitly

and spreads.

that the lower level elasticities

forms for the demand equations

for all three levels are

of Huang and Hang.

demand equations are based on the same theoretical

The brand level equations

on a fixed level of

elasticities.

based on the first order linear approximations

levels. The differences

both brand and segment

While all of the

model, they do differ between the

noted after each has been presented.

are the first stage.
This separation

Here demand is seperated into

was based on a study by Consumer

Reports that divided the margarine industry into distinct market segments based on the
ingredients.
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Demand for a brand is written in terms of prices and expenditures
segment only. No cross-segment

for that

price or other decision variable effects are included at

the brand level
The demand equations can be written in the general form:
Y,IIII
(28)

PrO +

==

Pi:?

MOr

/Pi

I

!3ifExP"lIll

+ E,1Pim!+

e., P/I11/+

/3'3 Mb, ",,

+

r

+

fJ,c,Unll!Il

I

+ Yr,DJ

/314

Advert,

+ Y,lD2

+

p,ITim,e

1315 Adriv,

f

+

+

+ ... + Y,.'8D.I,,'

where
= change in total expenditure

for the segment (either regular or spread)for

segment a, in market m, at time t
:;: change in own price in market m, at time
== change in rivals'

Ti me

price in market

111,

t

at time

t

= quarterly time trend
= change in the percent of volume sold under featured ads for brand i in
market m, at time t
= change in the percent of volume sold while on display for brand i in
market

111,

at time

t

= change in advertising

expenditures

for brand i, at time t

Adriv.,

= change in the sum of brand i's rivals' advertising

Untlillt

= change in the uni ts per pound for brand i in market rn, at time t

D, , "', D"

= dummy variables for 38 different regional markets.
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at time t

The next set of equations
segments.

represent

the empirical

The form of the demand equations

the brand level. There are some differences
variables,

advertising

that should be noted.

III I

The marketing

intensity variable. and the units per pound variable (Un~",,) have

'a' distinguishes

Yu
(29)

for the market

at the segment level is almost identical with

been removed since at this level of aggregation
The subscript

equations

=

1.jI(/()

lJIu4Ad.\pdllll

these variables

would be inappropriate.

the two segments:
+ If/utExp/

+ cpo/Pllm!

+ \fJ(l5Time

+ wulDI

+
+

<Ph2PhlJll
OJalD2

+

If/IIJAdregJlJ/

+ ... +

OJ 3"D.i8
II

where
= change in the quantity sold in segment a, in market m, at time t
Exp,

= change in industry level margarine expenditure
= change in the weighted

in market rn, at time t

average price for segment a, in market m, at

time t
= change in the weighted average price for segment b, in market m, at
time t
Adreg

= change in the sum of advertising

expenditures

in the regular margarine

expenditures

for the spread margarine

segment at time t
Adspd

= change in the sum of advertising
segment at time t

Time

= a time trend
= dummy variables for 38 different regional markets used in estimation
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+

The final stage is the Industry level. This equation
industry

level demand for margarine.
YJNn

(30)

=:

YI!

will be used to estimate the

It is

+ Y I Prllli

+ Y! P1JIIJ + Y ...Pop + V.; Inc

where
Y",,,

= change in total quantity of margarine

Pllld

::;

f\lIl

= change in aggregate

Pop

= change in domestic population

Inc

= change

sold

change in aggregate price for margarine

in per-capita

price for butter

income

At the industry level demand is not conditioned

on a fixed level of expenditure.

Instead

demand is written as a function of income.
Estimation

Method

The two brand level demand systems and the segment demand system were
estimated

using restricted iterative seemingly

unrelated regression

method was used to take into account any possible cross-equation
terms.

(SUR).

The SUR

correlation

of the error

SUR improves efficiency over ordinary least squares (OLS) if the independent

variables differ across equations and there is contemporaneous

correlation

of errors across

equations.

Improvement
realize efficiency

in efficiency

using SUR is a large sample property.

gains there must be a "reasonable
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In order to

amount of data .... " (SAS/ETS

User's Guide, p. 555). The 524 observations of margarine data should be enough to
reduce the sampling variability of the estimator - allowing for efficient SUR estimation.
The SUR estimates were constrained by three demand restrictions: symmetry,
Engle aggregation, and homogeneity.

Both Engle aggregation and symmetry are system

constraints that impose restrictions across equations. The homogeneity restriction
constrains the relationship of estimates within each equation. The actual restrictions used
can be found in the appendix.
Variables and Data
The scanner data are from the InfoScan data base purchased from Information
Resources, Inc. (IRI). lRI acquires supermarket scanner data from several retail markets
across the country. These data are assembled to calculate quantity, price, demographic,
and marketing variables for every brand sold. Additional data were taken from the
Leading National Advertisers (LNA) reports. LNA collects brand level advertising
expenditure data on the advertisers in each industry.
Most of the data for the brand and segment stages comes from the IRI data set; the
segment data are an aggregation of the brand level data. Not all of the margarine data
from the IRI data set is used in the final database. The following are the reasons for
taking only part of the available data.
To maintain a balanced panel data set every brand analyzed had to be in every
market in every period. Frequently, a brand was in many markets but not in all time
periods (the brand entered or exited the market). Conversely a brand might be in all (or
most) periods but be absent in some markets. The number of markets in the available
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data set ranged from 3R in 1988 to 65 in 1992 and included
tradeoff between markets versus periods had to be made.

a maximum of 150 brands.

A

The final data set consists of 39

regional retail markets spanning all four quarters in the years 1989 to 1992, all brands
from each segment present in every market and in every quarter. Five brands were in the
regular segment and seven brands were in the spread segment.
comprised

over 60 percent of total margarine

sales.

This final data set

While some regional economic

effects may be lost, it is hoped that the results will provide excellent estimates for these
national brands.

An additional 6th brand in the regular segment and 8th brand in the spread
segment were private-label
private-label

composites.

These composites

retail volume into the two segments

were created by splitting total

in a two to one ratio of regular

margarine

to spreads.

This division was based on past research and trade information.

drawback

of this approach is that "brand" level prices for private-label

same for both segmcnts. but given that IRI averages private-label
differences

across segments are impossible

composites

to discern.

were found in the Statistical

butter and margarine prices and margarine
Statistics publications.

are the

data by market, price

Data for the industry demand equation were taken from two sources.
income and population

A

The data on

Abstract of the United States.

The

quantity data are from Bureau of Labor

The industry level data are not disaggregated

over regional

markets as are the brand and segment data sets.
In following Huang and Hahn's specification
variables before they could be used in an estimation
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it was necessary to transform
procedure.

many

Much of the data is

transformed into the relative changes over time. For example Y;, '" at time t is defined to
be (Y;, '" -Y; ,_,'" j/Yi ,_,m- This procedure makes our data consistent with the first-order
differential functional form. One quarter of data is lost due to the first differencing of the
variables. This brings the number of quarters in the data set down to 15 from 16. It wi11
be explicitly noted which variables have not been so transformed and why they were not.
Quantity
The dependent variable used for demand is the relative change in volume
(pounds) sold. The quantity of the product sold at a given price equals the amount
consumers are willing and able to buy at that price. The brand level data were taken from
the IRI data set, except for the media advertising data taken from LNA. For the segment
level, brand level volumes in each segment were added together by market to yield an
aggregate value for quantity, Ii (Y;, ",). To differentiate segment quantity for each
segment the subscript a is used where a = 1 for the regular segment and 2 for the spread
segment. The quantity at the industry level was derived by summing both over segments
and markets, Ia I", Ii (Y;, '" l".
Expenditure
Demand theory clearly dictates that there be some expenditure or income variable
included in demand estimation. From theory it is expected that expenditure (income) wi11
have a positive effect

011

demand; this positive relationship will not hold, however, if the

product is an inferior good.
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At the brand level the expenditure variable is created by summing brand prices
multiplied by brand volume. More formally Li (P; r IttxY" Itt)

= Exp,

I

Itt , where i , a, t, and

m are index variables for brand, segment, time, and location, respectively. To account for
inflation the expenditure variables are divided by a regional consumer price index (CP~",)
all price and expenditure data must first be divided by the appropriate CPI to control for
inflation. Once the segment expenditures have been calculated it is possible to find the
industry expenditure. Industry expenditure is calculated as L" Expo, Itt

= Exp, Itt , where

EXPrItt is the industry expenditure in each regional market at time t. Note that we do not
have to divide the industry measure by the CPI because the data have been converted into
real expenditures at the segment level.
The industry stage is not conditional on a set expenditure, instead per-capita
income is used in place of an expenditure measure. These data were already in real terms
when they were collected. The source for the income data is the Statistical Abstract Of
the United States.

As with expenditure, demand is explicitly derived as a function of price. Theory
also predicts that own-price will be negatively related to quantity demanded while rivals'
prices may have either a negative or positive effect; it will be positive if it is a substitute,
negative if a complement. For margarine, the cross-price elasticities (coefficients on
rivals prices) are expected to be positive; i.e., they are substitute goods.
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The price data used at the brand level are the average price for the branded
product in each of the 39 markets. This price is the average price facing the consumer
"net of all discounts except manufactures' coupons .... " (Haller, 1994) The average price
for each segment was calculated by dividing expenditures by total volume. Specifically
Exp., m/ L; (Y; t m )

=

P"ml, where P"nll is the weighted average price for the segment. This

approach to calculating price takes into account the differences in brand sales. Before
being used in the analysis, the price data were divided by the relevant CPI .
The producer price index (PPI) is used as the price data for the industry
regressions. The monthly data are converted to quarterly data through simple averaging.
Because the data are an index there is no need to divide by the CPI.
Marketing Variables
Marketing variables are included with the presupposition that marketing efforts
will increase demand. The two marketing variables used are the percent of retail volume
in featured ads (Ma) and the percent of retail volume on display (Mb). Ma "measures the
percentage of the volume of a given brand sold during the quarter while featured in ...
newspaper advertising" (Haller, 1994). Mb "measures the percentage of the volume of a
given brand sold during the quarter in conjunction with some sort of in-store display ..."
(Haller, 1994). These variables are available only at the brand level.
Advertising
Like the marketing variables, advertising is often postulated to have a positive
impact on demand -both in total and for individual brands. Variables for own and rivals'
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advertising are included at the brand and segment stages. The industry regression has no
advertising variables due to a lack of available data. All of the advertising data come
from LNA and are not broken down by retail markets, hence each brand is assigned the
national value in each market. At the brand level there are the Avert and Adriv
advertising variables. Avert is own advertising expenditures and Adriv is the sum of
rivals' advertising. Rivals are competing brands in each segment and include only those
brands included in the data set.
Retail Dummv Variables
Included in the brand and segment level regression are several dummy variables.
These variables are included to account for regional differences in the structure of the
data. While there are 39 separate markets only 38 dummy variables are included to avoid
invertability of the design matrix. The intercept term should be interpreted as the fixed
effect of the 39th regional market. A table of all of the regional markets can be found in
the appendix.
Units per Pound
Units per pound (U;oI)is defined as the number of pounds sold divided by the
number of units sold. This measure is included to control for differences in package size
(e.g., a 10 oz. box vs. a 16 oz. economy size). This variable should account for differing
purchase decisions due to changes in packaging size. U;ntis included only in the brand
level regression.
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Population
Industry level demand includes a variable for population.
were taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
increase

in consumers

is included

Data for population

It is expected that with an

there would be an increase in quantity sold. A population variable

only in the industry regression.

That completes

the description

of the model, the variables,

We now turn to the actual empirical results of estimating
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and their data sources.

the demand system.

CHAPTER
EMPIRICAL

RESULTS

This chapter is comprised of the empirical
brand-level
level.

regular margarine, brand-level

Y

results for the four main segments:

spread margarine,

segment level, and industry

Due to the sheer number of estimates for market effects they will not be reported

on in this section.

Budget Shares
The budget shares of the brands indicate the relative size of each of the brands
within a segment.
elasticities.

This information

is useful when interpreting

The change in demand for a relatively

large percentage

Conversely,

large brand is unlikely to increase by a

when a small brand raises its price.

from the small to large brand is a smaller percentage

the cross-price

This is because the shift in demand
of the large brands total demand.

a price increase of a large brand will tend to have a larger impact on demand

for a smaller brand.
The budget shares for the regular segment are in table 3. Fleischmanns'
largest budget share, accounting
27% of the segment.

for 38% of the segment.

Parkay is the next largest with

These two players dominate the segment

with a combined share of

65%. The smaller three players represent only 22% of the segment:
10%, Mazola with 8%, and Imperial with only 4%. The Private-Label
of the segment.
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has the

Land 0' Lakes with
composite

is 13%

Table 3
Budget Shares for the Regular Margarine Segment

Budget Shares

Brands

Fleischmanns

38%

Parkay

27%

Land 0' Lakes

10%

Imperial

8%

Mazola

4%
13%

Private Label

The budget shares for the spread segment are found in table 4. The two largest
brands, I Can't Believe Its Not Butter and Shedds Country
expenditures

Crock, represent 56% of the

in the spread segment with budget shares of 23% each. Blue Bonnet and

Promise are the next two largest brands with budget shares of 17% and IS % respectively.
The smallest brands are: Country Morning Blend (7%), Shedds (4%), and Parkay Light
(3%). The Private-Label

composite

is in the same size range as the smallest brands with a

budget share of 7% .
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Table 4
Budget Shares for the Spread Margarine Segment

Budget Shares

Brands

I Can't Believe Its Not Butler

23%

Shedds Country Crock

23%

Blue Bonnet

17%

Promise

15%

Country Morning Blend

7%

Shedds

4%

Parkay Light

3%

Pri vate Label

7%

The Regular Margarine

Segment

The regular segment brand level results are presented
R' will be reported first, then the own and cross-price
elasticities
0.7909.

and control variables.

by the model.

Considering

All of the own- and cross-price
italicized values are t-statistics).

elasticities

The system

and finally the non-price

The overall model had a system weighted R2 of

This R' indicates that 79% of the variability

explained

in this section.

in the dependent

the complexity
elasticities

Own-price

of the model, this is an excellent fit.

for regular margarine

elasticities

diagonal and are in bold type. The cross-price

variables are

are displayed

elasticities

are in table 5 (the

along the main

are on the off-diagonal.

The

columns of table 3 represent the percent change in quantity of the brand due to a one
6S

percent change in price of the brand in each row. For example, Fleischmanns' (column
one) quantity demand increases by .125% with a I% increase in Imperial's (row two)
pnce

Conversely, the effect of a brand's pricing on other brands is read along the rows.
Table 5
Regular Margarine

Brands

Fleischmanns

Fleischmanns
Imperial
Land 0' Lakes
Mazola
Parkay
Private-Label

Own and Cross-Price

Imperial

Land 0'
Lakes

Elasticities

Mazola

Parkay

PrivateLabel

-1.293

0459

-0.064

0460

0.188

0.106

-23.127

4.171

-0.653

2.026

4.863

4.863

0.126

-2.896

-0.011

0.174

0272

0.236

6.1i30

-21.067

-0113

2.379

8975

6.23/

-0.013

-0.041

-I.103

-0.036

0.055

0.038

-0.665

-0.338

-0.113

-0.488

1.626

0.955

0.040

0.061

-0.017

-1.988

0.017

0.0917

1.946

1.860

-0.628

-10.024

1.374

2.222

0.150

0.814

0157

0.169

-1.695

0.3055

6.1i44

8156

1.626

1.952

-35.884

2.222

0056

0.351

0.064

0.365

0160

-1.861

1.1i61i

5.396

1.136

2.442

6.832

-22.939

".
The top number 111 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.

The own-price elasticity of Land 0' Lakes is the only statistically insignificant
own-price elasticity in the study. Land 0' Lakes' price effect is significant in the system
only in the two cross-price elasticities between Land 0' Lakes and Parkay. At first glance
these results appear to suggest that Land 0' Lakes' margarine is insulated from pricing
effects of rivals. Unfortunately, this does not explain why Land 0' Lakes pricing has no
real effect on its own and rivals' demand. Future research will be needed to explain Land
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0' Lakes' weak results. Perhaps as the only agricultural
0' Lakes behaves differently than investor-owned
Fleischmanns'

firms.

as a large brand, Fleischmanns'

rivals, especially on Imperial and Mazola.

pricing has a large effect on

A one percent increase in Fleischmanns'

increases Imperial's quantity by .459% and Mazola's
large brand, has a smaller increase in quantity,

quantity by .406%.

price

Parkay, the other

only .188% with a one percent increase in

price.

Parkay has the largest effect on Fleischmanns'
. I 50 % with a one percent change in price.
Fleischmanns'

in the industry, Land

has the most inelastic demand with an estimated elasticity of -

1.293. Not surprisingly,

Fleischmanns'

cooperative

quantity, increasing

quantity by

A price increase by Imperial increases

quantity almost as much as Parkay, with a cross-price

elasticity of .126.

This is interesting given that Parkay is almost three and a half times larger than Imperial.
Mazola, the smallest brand, and the Private-Label
Fleischmanns

composite

increases quantity for

by only .040 % and .056% when they increase price by one percent.

Imperial is the most elastic brand with an estimated

elasticity of -2.896. Imperial

has the strongest effects on Parkay and Private-Label

with cross-price

and .236 respectively.

effect on Mazola with a cross-price

Imperial also has a significant

elasticities

of .272

elasticity of .174.
A one percent increase in Parkay's price results in a .814% jump in Imperial's
quantity, a huge change.

As noted above Fleischmanns'

has a cross-price

elasticity

of

.459. Even Private-Label

has a large effect on Imperial with a cross-price

elasticity

of

.351. These high cross-price

elasticities

are consistent
67

with Imperial's high own-price

elasticity.

Only Mazola has a small effect on Imperial's

elasticity

quantity

with a cross-price

of .061 .
Mazolu has an own price elasticity

of -1.988.

The smallest brand in the regular

segment, Mazola has only small price effects on other brands'
elasticity

between Muzola and Private-Label

quantity.

The cross-price

is .092, which is the largest Mazola price

effect.
Parkay has an own-price elasticity
the segment.
Imperial's

of -1.695, the second most inelastic brand in

Imperial has the largest price effect on Parkay' s quantity.

price increases Parkay's

quantity by .272%.

The high cross-price

between these two brands suggests that they are seen as substitutes,
their customers.

Other than the previously

has the next largest impact on Parkay.
Parkay's

An increase in

at least for a subset of

noted effects of Fleischmanns,

As Private-Label's

elasticities

Private-Label

price increase by one percent

quantitv increases by .160%.
The Private-Label

composite

largest price effect on Private-Label
has a largc price effect, increasing
increase.

Fleischmanns

cross-price

has a own-price
with a cross-price

Private-Label

has a relatively

elasticity

of -1.861.

elasticity

of .306. Imperial also

sales by .234% with a one percent price

small impact on Private-Label

quantity with a

elasticity of . I06.

Overall the results for the regular segment are significant
price elasticities
insignificant

Parkay has the

at the 90% significance

estimates -the cross-price

level (two-tailed

test). Only one of the

elasticity of Fleischmanns'

not involve Land 0' Lakes.
6R

for 20 of the 30 cross-

on Private Label-

does

The results in the next section are taken from table 6. Included are all of the nonprice variables in the regular segment model.

Each variable's

impact will he discussed

separately.

Table 6
Regular Margarine: Results for the Non-Price Regression Variables
Variable

Fleischmanns

Imperial

Land 0' Lakes

Mazola

Parkay

Private
Label

-0014

0.258

0.016

-0.179

0.100

0.002

-0913

2.073

0.059

-2.93

3.247

0.052

0.935

1.253

0.974

0.856

1.002

1.085

42.436

8.188

6.462

11.421

27.741

31.592

Percent

0.004

0.037

0.088

0.014

0031

-

Featured

1402

1835

2.382

3.271

3.031

-

Percent on

ODD I

0.035

0.020

0.002

0.023

-

0.56

3.001

0.951

0.839

2.613

-

-0003

0.029

0.138

0.001

0.01 I

-

Intercept

Expenditure

Display
Own Ad
Expenditure

-0.63

1.559

5.083

0.067

1.381

-

Rivals Ad

0.028

-0.156

-0.040

-0.049

-0.017

-

Expenditure

3.338

-2.484

-0.436

-2.627

-1.303

-

Units per lb.

1.572

-0.526

-76.238

-2.205

0944

-

2971

-0.881

-0.323

-7379

0378

-

-0.002

0.01 I

0.003

0.007

0.001

0.002

-3.302

2.392

0.284

2.622

0961

1.534

Trend

Tbe top number 111 eacb cell IS the estimated
Tbe bottom number is the t-statistic.

coefficient.
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Expenditure
The expenditure elasticity is significant for all regular margarine brands. Imperial
margarine has the largest estimated expenditure elasticity at 1.25: Mazola has the lowest
with a .856 estimated expenditure elasticity. This indicates that there is an unequal
distribution of additional expenditures in the regular segment across brands. A one
percent increase in segment expenditure increases Imperial's quantity buy 1.25 percent
but Mazola enjoys only a .856 percent increase in sales volume.
Marketing Variables
For all of the branded regular margarines, the percent featured ad variable was
significant at the 90% confidence level. Feature ad marketing was most effective for
Land 0' Lakes with a one percent increase in feature ad marketing leading to .08 percent
increase in volume sold. Fleischmanns' sales increased by only .004 percent with a one
percent increase in ad marketing.
Only two of the margarines, Imperial and Parkay, had significant results for
display marketing. A one percent increase in display lead to an increase in sales of .0358
for Imperial and .023 for Parkay. The Private-Label composite did not use either
marketing tool.

Media Advertising
A brand's own media advertising expenditure was hypothesized to be positively
related to sales. Three of the branded margarines had significant results supporting this
hypothesis. A one percent increase in advertising expenditure increased Land 0' Lakes'
sales by .138 percent. The results for Imperial and Parkay are less dramatic with
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estimated

coefficients

of .029 and .0 II, respectively.

Private-Label

had no expenditures

for media advertising.
Includcd in each brand's equation was the sum of rivals'
hypothesized

to be negatively related to sales. This negative

Mazola, Imperial, and Parkay.
additional

Imperial's

percent of rival's advertising

by only .049 and .Ol7, respectively.
relationship
coefficient

sales decrease
expenditure.

Interestingly,

between rivals advertising

advertising,

relationship

Fleischmanns

sales decrease

exhibited a positive

and sales with an estimated

of .028, suggesting this brand benefits from the advertising

than from its own advertising.

was found for

by .155 percent with an

Mazola and Parkay's

expenditure

which was

Land 0' Lakes had a statistically

of its rivals more

insignificant

result.

Unit per Pound
Only two of the branded regular margarines
1'01'

unit per pound control variable.

units increased by 1%. Mazola's

Fleischmanns'

sales decreased

had significant

estimated coefficients

sales increased

by 1.572 % as the sales

by 2.205% as sales units increased by

I %. An increase in sales due to an increase in units per pound means that as the
containers

It may be that Flieischmanns

increase in size quantity increases.

lowers its price per pound with larger containers
may not significantly

leading to higher sales volume.

lower its average price per pound with its larger containers

drop in sales volume with larger packages.
degree of differences

significantly
Mazola
hence its

Further research is needed to determine the

in unit pricing across brands.
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A time variable was included to account for any residual time trends existing in
the data after differencing. The trend estimates, unlike the other parameter estimates, are
not elasticities. The estimates should be interpreted as the percent change in sales volume
due to an increase in time measured in quarters of a year. The sign indicates whether the
sales volume is increasing or decreasing over time, given the effects of the other variables
The trend variable was significant for four of the six regular margarines at the
90% confidence level. Of the margarine brands with significant trend values only
Fleischmanns has a negative trend coefficient (-.002). Imperial (.0107), Mazola (.007),
and Private label (.002) all had positive estimated coefficients.

Land 0' Lakes and Parkay

had an insigmficant estimated trend coefficient.

The Spread Margarine Segment
This section will examine the results of the demand system for the margarine
spread scgmcnl. Keeping with the preceding section, the order of presentation will be
budget shares, price elasticities (own and cross) will be reported first. Then the results for
the other variables included in the demand system are discussed. The model had a system
weighted R' of 0.7556, similar to that found in the regular margarine segment.
Prices
The own-price elasticities for the spreads are along the main diagonal in table 7
below. The price effects for each regression equation are read as in table 5. For example,
the estimated own-price elasticity for private label's price in the Promise equation is .096
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and the estimated own-price elasticity

for Promise's

price in the private label equation is

.155.
All of the own-price elasticities
spread segment.
relatively

The elasticities

are significant

at the 99% significance

level in the

range from the highly elastic Shedds (-3.473) to the

inelastic Country Morning Blend (-1.087).

Interestingly,

twice that of Shedds Country Crock (-1.725); the two products

Shedds elasticity is

are from the same brand

family.
Of the cross-price
the 90% confidence

elasticities,

36 of the 56 are statistically

level. Of the 36 significant

negative - the cross-price

cross-price

different from zero at

elasticities

only five are

elasticity of "I Can't Believe Its Not Butter" (lCBINB)

Shedds is the only estimate of the five that does not involve Private Label.
has a negative cross-price

on

Private Label

elasticity for Country Morning Blend and Parkay Light.

Conversely,

both Country Morning Blend and Parkay Light have negative cross-price

elasticities

for Private Label. The prices for Blue Bonnet and Promise were significant

all system demand equations except for Blue Bonnet in the Shedds' equation.
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Table 7
Spread Margarine Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities
Brands

Blue

CMB

[CBINB

Bonnet
Blue

Parkay

Promise

Shedds

Light

Shedds

Private-

Cntry C.

Label

-2.083

0.228

0.110

0.173

0.259

-0.148

0.318

0.446

-27.767

3.998

2.992

4.1l5

4.085

-0.744

9.887

8.069

0.072

-1.087

0.048

0.056

0.089

-0 112

-0015

-0.369

2.799

-8. 709

1.130

0654

3.331

-1.383

-0450

-4.633

0.000

0.083

-1.463

0.318

0.090

-0.467

0.329

0.311

-0.001

0.598

-15.240

2.772

1.490

-2.482

5.352

2.503

Parkay

0019

0.022

0.052

-1.443

0032

-0.024

0.005

-0109

Light

2.073

0555

3.156

-20.308

3.097

-0.839

0.418

-3.305

Promise

o

0137

0058

0.116

-2.043

1.913

0.078

0.155

2312

2.612

1.700

2.663

-19.702

6.351

2.648

3.020

-0.007

-0.020

-0.026

0.017

0.571

-3.473

0.082

0.053

-0141

-0.484

-0.927

0.563

7.186

3.373

1.290

Shedds

0.310

-0.096

0.353

0.016

0.147

0.182

-1.725

0.166

Cntry C.

6.251

-0.888

5804

0.187

2.731

1.072

-24.576

1.690

Private-

0.158

-0.328

0.116

-0.199

0.096

0.025

0068

-1.835

Lahel

6.992

-4548

3.367

-3.075
4.099
>11 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.

0.354

2.460

-20.293

Bonnet
eMB

[CBINB

Shedds

131

-I'he top number

-lJ033

The results for the non-price variables in the spread segment model are included
in table 8. Each variable's impact will be discussed separately.
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Expenditures
Allor the estimated expenditure elasticities are significant at the 99% confidence
level and have the hypothesized positive sign. The estimates range from .751 for I Can't
Believe its Not Butter to 2.104 for Shedds. Shedds' volume sold increases by over two
percent as spread segment expenditures increase by one percent.
Marketing Variables
The estimated coefficients for Percent on Featured Ad, were positive and
significant for three of the brands: Blue Bonnet, Country Morning Blend, and I Can't
Believe its Not Butter. Surprisingly, two of the brands, Parkay Light and Parkay, had
negative estimates. None of the estimates the for Percent on Featured Ad was greater
than .025, indicaung very week responses, if any, from featured ad.
The other marketing variable, Percent on Display, had a significant estimated
coefficient for Blue Bonnet, Country Morning Blend, Shedds, and Shedds Country Crock.
Shedds had the largest elasticity with a one percent increase in volume on display leading
to an increase of .183 percent of sales volume. The elasticities for the other brands were
much smaller.
Media Advertising
The effect of brand advertising should be to increase brand sales. Surprisingly,
only Promise (.087) and I Can't Believe Its Not Butter (.054) had positive and significant
estimates. Three of the branded spreads, Blue Bonnet (-.002), Parkay Light (-.002), and
Shedds Country Crock (-.005), were negative and "significant" at the 90% significance

7S

level.

These rcsu Its might be due to the lack of advertising

data for each of the retail

markets.
Rivals' advertising
This expectation
(-.027).

often decreases sales by luring customers

held only for Blue Bonnet (-.047) and I Can't Believe Its Not Butter

Parkay Light (.100), Promise (.106), and Shedds Country

positive estimates for rival's advertising.
increasing

to other products.

Advertising

the rival's sales if the advertising

Crock (.014) all had

could provide a free ride for a rival,

does not significantly

differentiate

the brand

frorn the general segment.
Unit per Pound
Only three of the five'o branded spreads had significant
Pound.

estimates

for Unit per

Blue Bonnet (.359) and Promise (8.464) and Shedds Country Crock (.262) all had

positive estimates - the Promise estimate is surprisingly

large.

Its Not Butter had negative estimates but were statistically

Shedds and I Can't Believe

insignificant.

regular margarine it may be that brands do not equally discount

their larger containers.

Of the eight brands only Promise and Shedds had insignificant
coefficients
estimates
accounted

for the time trend.

estimated

Private Label (.002) and Blue Bonnet (.003) had positive

for the trend - sales have been increasing
for in the model.

As with the

over time due to some factor not

Country Morning Blend (-.004), I Can't Believe Its Not

Unit of sale was not included in the Country Morning Blend equation. The unit of sale
was constant over the time period resulting in zero for all values. Inclusion would have
prohibited estimation of the equation.
in
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Butler (-.003), Parkay Light (-.004). and Shedds Country Crock (-.002) all have had sales
decrease when ali other variables in the model are held constant.
Table 8
Spread Margarine Non-Price Regression Variables

Blue

Variable

CMB

ICBINB

Parkay

Promise

Shedds

Lizht

Bonnet

PrivateCntry C. Label
Shedds

0.134

0043

0056

0.011

-0.029

0.259

0.027

0.010

2.979

1.304

2.503

0.453

-0.254

0.696

1.396

0.288

1.399

j

.062

0.751

0.946

0.758

2.104

0.859

1.182

20.924

21.561

21.897

24.080

6.676

5.410

28.882

27.255

0.003

-0.004

-0.003

-0.004

-0.004

0.015

-0.002

0.002

1.753

-3.161

-3.219

-4.108

-1.082

1.1 12

-2.982

1.852

Percent

0.025

0.010

0.010

-0.007

-0.048

-0.030

0.006

-

Featured

2.4XX

4.303

2.2X1

-2.316

-2.772

-0.626

1.437

-

Percent on

0.020

0004

0.001

-0.00 I

-0.001

0.183

0.007

-

Display

3.131

2.nO

0.667

-0.448

-0.175

4.567

2.218

-

Intercept
Expenditure
Trend

Own Ad
Expenditure

-0002

-0.001

0.054

-0.002

0.087

-0.174

-0.005

-

-1.616

-0.9XX

4.1XO

-2114

4.0XO

-1.520

-2.547

-

Rivals Ad

-0.047

-0.003

-0.027

0.100

0.106

-0.046

0.014

-

Expenditure

-3.14X

-0.31X

-3.659

10540

2.790

-0.753

2.211

-

-0.071

-0.090

8.464

-1.607

0.262

-

2.153
-1.455
-0.074
3461
The top number 111 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.

-0.672

6053

-

Units per lb.

0.359

-

Segment Level Regression Coefficients
The results from the segment level regressions are reported in this section. The
segment level regressions are the aggregations of the regular and spread segments. The
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segment model has two equations. one for the regular segment and one for the spread
segment. The results for the segment level regressions are found in table 9.
Estimated own-price elasticities for the spreads and regular margarine at the
segment level are very similar - - 1.345 for spreads versus -1.386 for regular margarine.
Both estimates are statistically significant at the 95% level. The cross-price elasticities
are also very similar and significant; .345 for spreads and .386 for regular margarine.
Expenditure was significant with elasticity measures of .959 for spreads and 1.041
for regular margarine. Spread and regular margarine have equal market shares so the
Engle aggregation restriction was .5 h, +.5h,

=

1. As a result the expenditure elasticity

estimates average to 1.
The results for all of the elasticities are significant and of the hypothesized sign.
Given the brand level elasticity estimates the segment results appear to be of the proper
magnitude. It is expected that increases in aggregation will lead to less elastic measures.
Only Country Morning Blend was less elastic than the segment elasticity measure and
only Fleischmanns was less elastic than the regular margarine elasticity estimare.'!
Advertising expenditures are hypothesized to have a positive effect on quantity
demanded and a negative effect on rivals' quantity. While the estimated coefficients for
regular and spread advertising have the hypothesized signs for each equation. only the
estimated coefficient for advertising expenditures for regular margarine demand was
significant.

H

Land 0' Lakes was not considered because the estimate was not statistically significant.
78

The estimated
increase

effect of regular advertising on regular demand is .002 - a one percent

in advertising

expenditure

yields a .002 percent increase in volume sold.

A time trend variable was also included in the segment level system. The trend
was insignificant
margarine

for the both Spread and Regular margarine segments. Suggesting that

sales volume has not been systematically

increasing or decreasing over lime

when other variables are accounted for.
Table 9
Segment Regression Estimates
Spreads

Variable

Regular

-0.023

-0.009

-2.563

-0.902

.1.345

0.345

-65.379

I6.763

0.386

.1.386

21.359

-76.756

0.959

1.041

Intercept

Spreads

Regular

Expenditure

79.591

86356

Spread

0.005

-0.008

Advertising

0.858

-1.25I

Regular

-0.000

0.002

Advertising

-0.259

2.730

Time

-0.000

-0.000

The top number

III

-0.199
-0.796
each cell IS the estimated coefficient.

The bottom number is the t-statistic.
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Industry Level
The final level of analysis, and the most aggregated,
equation.

The results from the regression

presented

in the -.une order as the previous models.

is the industry regression

are reported in table 10. The results are

The results at the industry level are much less robust than the brand and segment
level models.
regressions.
insignificant.

The R' for the regression
The estimated coefficient

was .4938 - much lower than the other
for the industry price elasticity

The estimated coefficient

sign of -.7, but it too is insignificant

for price of butter had an unexpected

at the 95% significance

variable Was significant with a parameter

is -.584, but it is

level.

Only the population

estimate of 31.373 -an unbelievable

that it is unlikely that a one percent increase in the population

improper model specification,

aggregated

quantity measure from the truncated

appropriate

measure of industry demand for margarine.

used a quantity measure from the Statistical
source for the independent

result given

would lead to a 31.373

percent increase in margarine sales. It is clear that the industry regression
possibly due to data limitations,

negative

is not robust,

or both. The use of a

IRI data set may not be the most
A future regression

model that

Abstract of the United States, which was the

variables, might yield better results.
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Table 10
Industry Results
Estimate

Variable
Price of Margarine

t-statistic

-0.584

-0.835

-0.7

-1.287

Population

31.373

3.312

Income

A.996

-0.634

Price of Butter

Intercept
o>_. __...~

~, __ ••o~

-0.072

O~~,A~
__
' ~~_,W_M"·~_"_~~

__'o'_·~_~·

-1.58

'

N=30, R2 = .4938
Due to the weak results of the industry regression,
unconditional

elasticities

will not be performed

to a robust model for industry level margarine
differential

the calculation

in this Thesis.
demand.

model may result in robust estimates

Future analysis may lead

Using better data, the first order

of elasticities.

These estimates could be

used with the brand and segment level results to convert the conditional
unconditional

price elasticities.

81

of

elasticities

into

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS
The industrial organization literature is filed with a variety of theory and empirical
work attempting to understand the structure of markets. The reason for this interest stems
from the basic premise that competitive markets yield efficient allocations of society's
scarce resources. When markets are not competitive resources are not put toward their
optimal use. Assessing competitive performance is essential for designing and applying
governmental policy designed to correct market imperfections.
Much of the early work in industrial organization focused on basic structural
variables (e.g., number of firms, CR4, or H-index) to determine market performance. In
the early 1980s economists began to look at more rigorous models derived from
economic theory to examine market performance.

Recent availability of detailed point of

sale data bas created opportunities to use more complex econometric models.
The research of this thesis takes advantage of supermarket scanner data to apply
brand level demand models to the margarine industry. The demand models were used to
estimate own- and cross-price elasticities that could be used to assess the degree of
product differentiation, a form of market power. Before the empirical model was
specified, a review of the conditions for consumer aggregation was presented in Chapter
3.

In Chapter 3 it was shown that the first order differential demand model
will be consistent with consumer aggregation only if it has an elasticity structure
consistent with a utility function of the Gormon form. This structure was derived by
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substituting the general utility function of Hang and Hauhn with a Gormon form utility
function. Even though this elasticity structure must be assumed, the derivation shows
that the first order demand model is not inherently inconsistent with a utility structure
needed for consumer aggregation. Many empirical demand models, such as the log-log
model, are not deri vable from a utility function and are therefore structurally inconsistent
with demand theory.
The empirical estimation using scanner data was successful - the estimated price
elasticities were largely significant and credible. The brand level model also estimated
the effects of two in store marketing variables on demand, percent on featured advertising
and percent on display. Most of the significant estimated coefficients were positive (sales
volume increased) for brands that were 'featured' in store advertising. However, two
brands had estimated coefficients that were negative when featured in an in-store
advertisement .. All of the significant estimates for percent of a brand's sales that were on
display were positive. Overall, in store marketing factors increase the quantity demanded
for a brand.
Unlike the in store marketing factors, advertising were often not of the hypothesized sign.
A brand's advertising expenditures should lead to greater sales for the brand. Many of
the brand had negitive estimated coefficents for own-advertising effects, suggesting a
decrease in sales volume. The advertising data were not as rich as the in store marketing
variables - there was no variation in the advertising variables across markets. Of the 12
brands, nine were significant but only five of these had the expected positive sign.

Effects by rival's advertising
While rivals' advertising
increases

can be hypothesized

to be either negative or positive.

may draw sales for a brand it is possible that rivals' advertising

the brand's sales.

If the advertising

does not significantly

differentiate

the

brands from the general product segment then rivals may be providing an advertising free

ride for the brand.

The estimated coefficients

for rivals' advertising

did differ by sign.

Even though the results are not in conflict with theory they should be interpreted
caution in-light of the data issues discussed

above.

The results at the segment level were robust.
elasticities

advertising

signs.

Advertising

was successful,

its impact.

Land 0' Lakes was an exception.

0' Lakes brand margarine did not yield significant
may be that as a cooperative-owned

results in the demand estimation.

Land
It

brand, Land 0' Lakes may respond to market

differently than investor owned firms.

But this would not explain why

Country Morning Blend, another Land 0' Lakes brand, was estimated
spread segment.

Rival's

As with the brand level regressions,

data did not vary across markets, possibly reducing

While model estimation

expenditures

but not for the spread segment.

was not significant for either segment.

the advertising

conditions

All of the price and expenditure

were significant and had the hypothesized

were also significant for regular margarine,

with

Possibly data collection

or processing

successfully

in the

errors are the cause of the weak

results.
The robust brand level elasticity estimates clearly show that the margarine
industry is significantly
estimations

differentiated.

price elasticities

In both the brand and the segment level

revealed that I % price increases lead to a drop in sales of no
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more than 3 % for any brand - considerably
perfectly competitive

market.

Major market structures
the margarine

are shown in Table 11 (a repeat of Table I). Given that

industry is differentiated,

down to just two possible structures
competition.

less than the 100% drop expected in the

Either is sufficient

the industry's

- differentiated

market structure can be narrowed
oligopoly

or monopolistic

to conclude the existence of market power.

Scherer and Ross "Pure monopolists,

oligopolists,

and monopolistic

that its output decisions

Re-quoting

competitors

share a

common characteristic:

each recognizes

have a perceptible

influence on price ....

All three types possess ... market power "." (Scherer and Ross,

1990 p. 17)

Table 11
Principal Seller's Market Structure Types
N umber of Sellers
A Few

One

Many

Products
Homogeneous

Pure

Ditferentiated

monopoly

The importance
that consumers

Homogeneous

Pure

monopoly

oligopoly

competition

Pure multiproduct

Differentiated

Monopolistic

oligopoly

competition

of finding market power in the margarine

pay too high a price for margarine.

suggests that industries in general

12italicized

in original

The importance

industry is not so much
is more that it

do not have a perfectly competitive

structure.

The

margarine product is by its physical nature relatively homogenous.

However, these

results suggest firms have found ways to create brand differentiation with out resulting to
physical changes. Consumers have responded to the various strategies firms have used to
differentiate their brands. As the degree of product differentiation increases the
probability [or market power increases.
competition

If market power is prevalent, then perfect

is not.

If scanner data were more readily available to researchers, both 10 and demand
economists would be able to improve their contributions.

Scanner data afford the

researcher the ability to model markets at the brand level and in the future possibly at the
product level. Future studies might model the change of demand conditions over time or
across markets. However, such scanner data are not widely available and typically
include confidentiality clauses that limit their usefulness for public research. Thus,
although the promise is exciting the reality is frustrating to public research.

K6

APPENDIX
SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand

data thesis:
lnfilc '/usr2/SAS/s;1s609/dalU4ll.csY·
dlm=-',' Irecle I00000;
input Year Quarter MRK1D vi v2 V) v4 v5 vf \'7
vpls v8 v9 vro vii vl2 vplr PI P2 Pol P4 P5 P6 P7 pH
p9plOplj
pl2ppiAI
A2A:lA4A5A6A7A8A9AIOAI1
AI2
mal mb I ma21l1b2 IlKl3mb3 maambq maf mb5 mao mb6 ma7 mb7 ma8
mb81l1a9mb9malOmhlOlllulJ
mhllmal2mhl2
Tillll:uJ u2u3u4u5u6u7u8u9ulOuil
ul2EXPscxpr
sal sa2 sa3 sa4 saS sa6 sa? sa8 sa9 salu sa! I .~a12:
If MRKID=l then Dl=-]; else Dl=O:
If MRKID=3 then 0:1=[, else 0.1=0;
[I' MRKID=c.4 then 04=1:

else [)4=():

If MRKID=5
then D5= I: else 1)5=0;
If M R K 10=8 then 08= I. else D8=():

If MRKID=11
then DJ 1=1: else D II=U:
If MRKID= 12 then [) 12= I: else D 12=0:
If MRKID=13 then 01.1=1; else DI3=O;
[I'

fvtRKJI)=14

then D 14= I, else D 14=0;

If MRKfO=15 then 015=1: else 015=0,
IfMRKID=16 then 016=1: clxe 1)16=0;
If MRKID= 18 then D I H= I: else f) 18=();
If MRKID=D then 02:1=1: else 023=0;
If MRKIO=24 then 024= I. else D24=0;
If MRKID=25 then 025=1. else 025=0:
If MRKID=26 then 026=1; else 026=0:
If MRKID=27 then 027=1: else 027=0:
If MRKID=29 then 029=1: else 029=0:
[f MRK[0=:11 then OJ 1=1: else 0:11=0:
IfMRKID=.12 then 0.12=1: else lYU=O:
If MRKID=:1:11hcn D.1.1=I: cbe D3:1=0;
If MRKID=:14then lJ:l4=L else D:14=0;
If MRKlIJ=35 then 035= l ; clxc 1):15=0;
If MRKID=.16thcn 0.16=1: else 1)36=0:
If MRKID=.17 then D:17=1; else 0:17=0;
If MRKID=3H then D.1g=l; else 0.18=0:
If MRKID=.19 then D39=1: else 039=0;
If !\1J{KID=4o then D~O=I, else D40=0;
If MRKID=41 then 041= I: else 041=0:
If MRKJD=4:1 then D43=1: else 04]=0;
If MRKID=44 then 044= I: else 044=0.
If l\1HKfO=45 then 1)45=1; else 1)45=();
rr MRK ID=4K then 048= I. else [)4S=O:
If MRKID=49 then 049=1, else 049={);
If MRKID=53 then 053= I; else 05.1=0;
If MRKJl)=54 then 054=1: else 054=0;
If MRKID=61 then 061=1.clsc D61=0;
If i\IRKID=6.1then 06.1=1: else 06.1=0;
If MRKID=65 then 065=1; else D65=O:
run;
proc syslin itsur octnethcsis

convcrgeeul llIaxiter=200:
modelv8=exprPHP9plOPII
Pl2 PplTIME
til d4 d5 d8 dll dl2 dlJ dt4 dt5 dl6dlHdD
d24 d25 d26 cJ27d29 dll dJ2 d3.1d34
d.15 cJ36dJ7 d.18dY:Jd40 d4 I d41 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS3 d54 dbl d6:1d65
MAS MB8 AS sa8 llR:
rGslric! p8+p9+p 1O+pll+pI2+ppl+cxpr=O;
b: model v9=expr PH P9 plO PII PI:! Ppl TIME
<l
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SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand cont.
d3 d4 dS dH ell J dl~ elL{ dl4 dIS clio dIS d~.1 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29 d.11 d.12 d:n d.14
d:'lS tD6 d.17 oJ/l dW d4{) d41 <143d44 d45 d48 d49 dS} d54 d61 d6.1 d65
MA9 MA9 A9 sa9 uc:

restrict
pH+p9+p [O+p I I +p 12+ppl+cxpr:=O:
c
mode! vl Oeexpr PH 1'9 plO PI r PI2 Prj TIME

<In dl4 diS dl6 dl8 d23 d24 ellS d26 dn d29 d31 d32 d3.1lB4
d35 d36 (1;17d3H d.19 d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d4H d49 dS} d54 d6l d63 d65
MAIO MAIO alO s,l!U lIIU:
restrict
p8+p9+plO+p
I I +p J 2+ppl+cxpr:=O:
d: lHoddvll=cxprPt;P9pIOPIJ
PI2 PplTlME
(D d4 ciS ciS au dll dJ3 d14 diS dl6 dl8 <123d24 el25 d26 d27 d29 d31 ell2 d3J d34
dJ.'i d:l6 d37 d38 d39 d4() 04 J d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS3 d54 d6J d63 d65
MAlI MBII all sat t ull:
restrict p8+pY+pJ O+pJ I +p 12+ppl+cxpr:::O:
e
moddvl2=exprP8P9plOPJI
PI2 PplTIME
d3 d4dS d8 ell I dl2 tin dl4 dl5 dl6dl8 d23 d24 d2S d26 d27 d29 d:\1 d32 d33 d34
d.15 d36 d37 ,1:\8 dll.) d40 d41 d41 d44 d45 d4H d49 d53 d54 d61 d6l d65
MAI2 MBI2 nIl sal::' u12;
restrict p8+p9+pl O+p II +pI2+ppl+expr=O;
f: rnodeJvplr=exprP8P9pIOPII
PI2 PplTIME
d1 d4 el5 d8 dll dl2 dn dl4 drS diG dl8 dl1 d24dlS d26d27 d29 d31 d32 d:B (134
<1.15d36 d37 d.18 dl9 d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dSl d54 d61 d63 d65;
restrict p8+p9+pIO+pll+pI2+ppl+cxpr=O;
sresurct
d.1 d4 dS <18ell J ell2

.3825693 "a.ex pr+.0828384 "b.expr- .0997484 "c.ex pr+.0358 I06*d.expr+ .26S0956*e.ex pr
+, 1309377*f.expr= I,
2.6139*b.p8+b.expr-12.0717*a.p9-n.expr=O.
IO.0252*b.p IO+b,expr-12.07 [7*c.p9-c.expr=O,
27.9248*b.pll +b,cxpr-12.0717*d.p9-d.expr=O,
3.73*b.pI2+b.expr-12.0717*e.p9-e.expr=O.
7.6372*b,ppl+h.expr-12.0717*f.p9-fexpr=O.
IO.02S2*a.p IO+a,expr -2.6139*c.pH -c.expr=O.
27.9248"'a.pll +a.expr-2.6139*d.p8-d,expr=O,
3,73*3. P 12+a.expr -2.6 I39*e.pH-e.ex pr=O,
7.6372*a ppl+a.expr-2.6139*f.pH-r.cxpr=O.
27.924H*c.p II +c.expr-I O.02.'i2*d.pl O-d.expr=O.
3.73*c.pI2+c.cxpr-1 O.0252*c.pl O-e.expr=O.
7 ,6372*c. ppl+c,expr- ! n,02Sl *f.p I0- f.expr=O.
1, 73*d.pI2+d.expr-27.9248*e.p
II-c.expr=O,
7.6172*d.ppJ+d.expr-27 .9248*f.p II -fexpr=O.
7,6172"e.ppl +c.cxpr -~.73*f P 12-fcx pr=O;
J'llll.
rUIl.

d,lla thesis;
Infile '/lIsr2/SAS/sa~6D9/daI041I.csv·
dlm=',' Irecl=rOOOOO;
input Year Quc1.l1crMRKID v I v2 v~ v4 v5 v6 v7
vpls vR v9 vlO vI I vl2 vplr PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 p8
p9 pJO pi J pl2 ppl AI A2 A3 A4 AS A6 A7 AS A9 AIO All Al2
1ll;)1mbl rnn2 mb2 ma3 mh1 ma4 ruM m<l5 Illb5 ma6 mb6 rna7 mb7 ma8
mbS llIa91l1b91llClIOmhlO lila I I mhll moll whl2
Time ul u2 u1 u4 uS u6u7 uSu9ulOuil
ul2 EXPsexpr
s,lI sa2 saJ sa4 sa) s,16 sa7 sa8 sa9 sa 10 sa I I sa 12;
If MRKID=I Ihen DI=I, else 01=0:
If MRKID=3 then D3=1: else D3=0;
If MRKID=4 lhen 04=1: else 04=0;
If MRKID=5 then D5=1; else D5=0;
If MRKIO=8 then D8= I, else D8=0;
If MRKID=11 then 011=1; else DII=O;
If IvtRKIO=12 then DI2=1; el.<;eDI2=0:
If MRKID=I J lhen DU=I; dse 013=0:
IfMRKID=14Ihcn
DI4=L else 014=0;
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SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand cont.
If MRK lD=:l S then IJ J 5= I. cbc D 15=0.
[I' MRK [[)= 16 then lJ I (1= 1: else D 16=0:
If MRK 10= I B then fJ I H= I; else I) J B=O:
If MRKID=~:1

then D23=I:

If MRKID=24Ihcll
If MRKID=25

D14=1:

else D2~=(}:
else D24=0;

then D~5= I. else D25=0:

If MRKID=26 then 026= I: else D26=0;
If MRKJD=17 then D27=1. else D27=();
If MRKID=29

then D29=J:

else 029=0;

If MRKID=JI then OJ 1=1, else
If MRKID=:n then 032= I: else
If MRKID=D then DJ]:::: I; else
If MRKID=J4
then 034= J. else
IfMRKID=J5then
OJ5:::!. else

D31=O:
032=0:
D11=0;
034=0;

D35=0;

If MRKID=16

then 01(}::: I; else DJ6=();

If MRKID=J7

then D37=1:

If MRKID=J8

then 0.18= I, else D38=0;

else DJ7=();

If MRKID=W then DJ~=I. else D39=0;
If MRKID=40

then D40:;;:;I: else 1)40=0:

If MRKID=41

then D41::: I: else 041 :::0;

If MRKJl)=43
IfMRKID:::44
If MRKID:::45
If MRKID=48
If MRKID=49
If MRKID=51
If MRKID=54
If MRKID:::61
If MRKID=6:'
IfMRKID=65

then
then
then
then
then
then
then
then
then
then

041::: I: else
044:::1. else
D45:::1: else
D48:::1: else
D4C)=I: else
05:'>:::1.else
D54=!, else
061=1: else
D6.1:::I: else
065=1: else

041:::0:
D44:::0:
045:::0:
048=0:
D49:::0:
051=0;
D54=0;
061:::0:
06.1=0;
065=0:

run:

proc syslin itsur dat;l:::thcsi.~ convcrgceu.t
1ll,'lxitcr:::200:
a: model vf e cxps PI P2plP4P5p6p7PplTlME
d3 d4 d5 dB ull dl2 d13 dl4 dl5 dl6 dl8 dn d14 d25 d16 d27 d19d.11 d31 tiD d14
d35 d.16 d37 d38 d3l! L!40d41 d4:'1d44 d45 d48 d49 u53 d54 d61 d61 d65
MAl MBI Al sal ul;
restrict pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p7 +ppl+exps:::O:
1.1'
model v2= cxps PI P2 p3 P4 P5 p6 p7 PrJ TIME
d1 d4 d5 u8 dll d12d13 dl4 dl5 dl6 dl8 u23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29d31 d32 d:'l3 d34
d35 d36 d37 d38 tl19 d40 d4! d43 J44 d45 048 d49 (1."i3d54 d6 I d61 tl65
MA2 MB2,'i2 sa2 .
restrict
pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p7+ppl+exps=O;
C"
model \'3::: exp.' PI P2 p3 P4 P5 po 1'7 Ppl TIME
tl3 d4d5 dS til I elI2 d!3 dl4 £115dl6 dl8 <123d24d25 d26 d27 d29 el31 tl32 d33 d34
d.15 d36 d37 <.138d3l.)d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS1 tlS4 d6 J d63 d65
MA3 MB3 a3 sa3 u3;
restrict
p I+p2+p~+p4+p5+p6+p7 +ppl+exps:::O:
d: model \'4= eX[1sPI P2 rJ P4 PS p6 p7 Ppl TIME
el3 d4 d5 dS dl I dl ~ <llJ dl4 dl5 dl6 .us d23 d14 d25 d26 d27 d29 tl31 d32 d33 dJ4
d~5 d36 d17 d3S tl39 d40 d4 [ d4.1 <144d45 d48 d49 d53 d54 d61 d61 <165
MA4 MB" a4 sa4 u4:
restriCl
pI +p2+pl+p4+r5+p6+p 7+ppl+exps:;:O.
e: model \"5= exps PI P2 pJ P4 P5 pb p7 Ppl TIME
d3 d4 d5 dS dll dl2 dD dl4 dl5 dl6 dIg u23 d24 d25 d2fl d27 d29d3J d32 d33 d34
d35 d36 ul? ellS d.19 d..tOd41 d43 d44 d45 d4S <149d53 d54 d61 d63 tiM
MA5 MB5 a5 sa5 u5.
restrict
pi +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p 7+ppl+exps:::U;
f. modet \'6= exps PI Pl p3 P4 P5 1'6 p7 Ppl TIME
d3 d4 d5 d8 ull dl2 elD dl4 dIS dl6dl8 d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29 d31 dJ2 d33 d34
d35 d30 d37 el3x d39 tl40 d41 d41 d44 d45 £148d49 tlS1 d54 d6 I d6J d65
MA6 MR6 a6 sa6 u6:
restrict
pi +p2+pl+p4+p5+p6+p7+ppl+cxp.,=O;
g: mudel v7= exps PI P1 1'1 P4 P5 p6 p7 Prl TIME
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SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand cont.
d3 d4 dS dH (Ill

d12 <lD <114elL'i dlf diS <12.1 d24 d25 d26 (117 d29 d3J d32 <13.1d14

1.1.15d36 d37 d}l:l d3lJ d4{) d4l don d44 d45 d48 d49 dS} d54 d61 d63 d65

MA7 MB? a7 s:17 u7;
restnct
pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p 7+ppJ+cxps=O:
h
model vpls;;;:exps PI P2 p3 P4 P5 pf 1'7 Ppt TIME
d;\ d4d.'i d8dll dJ2dD dJ4 dIS dl6 dlRd2.1 d14d15 d26d27 d29d3J d32d33 <134
d35 d36 d37 cL\8 d.W d40 t141 d43 d44 d45 <148049 d53 d54 d6 [ d6:! d65:
restrict

pi +p2+pJ+p4+pS+p6+p7

+ppl -cx ps==O;

srestrict ./705309*a.cx lh+ .0725 217"'h.exps+.2344473*c.exps+.OJ35613*d.cxp.<>+.
+.040336*fexpH.2334696*g,CXpH.0659
I94*h.exp,s= I,
5.864*b.p I-eb.exps-! J 789"'a.p2-;I.exps=O,
5.864 *c.p I .ec.cxps -4.26515 ;'a.pJ -u.ex ps:::O.
5.864*d. p I-d.exps -29,7962 *' ,I. p4 -a.expsen.
5.864*e. pi -c.exps -6,70 179* a.p'i -n.cx ps:::O.
5.864*f,pl +f.exps-24.7917*a.p6-a.exps=O.
5.864 "'g.p I+g.ex[)S-4.2Kt2*a.p 7 -a.cx ps=O.
5.864"'h.p 1+h.cxps-15. J 7*a ppt-a.expsetj.
I:I.789*c .p2+c.exp~ -4.265:15 "'h.p~ -bcx ps=O.
13,789*d.p2+J .cxps -2tJ.7%2 *b.p4 -b.expxeO.
1:1,789*e, p2+e.cxps-(,.70 J79*h.p5 -b.ex ps=O.
13.789*f.p2+f.exps-24.7917*h.p6-h.exps=O.
13.789*g.p2+g.ex ps-4.28J2*h.p7 -n .expseO,
13.789*h.p2+h.cxps- J 5.17"'b.ppl-b.exps=O.
4-.26535'"d.p3+d. exps -29.7962 "c. p4 -c .cx p.s:::O.
4.26535*e.p3+c.cxp';-6.70179*c.p5-c.exps:::O.
4.26535 *fp3+f.exps-24. 79 I7*c.p6-c.exps=O.
4.26535*g pf-eg.cxr», -4 ,2832 *c.p7 -c.expseu,
4.26535"'h.p3+h.cxps -15. J 7*c.ppl-c.ex p,<;=O.
29 .7962*e, pa-c.cxps-o. 70 I 79*d, pS -d.cxpse O,
29,7962* f.p4+f.ex ps -24. 7917*d .p6 -d.expsen,
29.7962*g,p4+g.cxps-4.2832*d.p7-d.cxps:::O.
29 .7962*h. p-i-sh.cxps -15.17*d.ppl-d.cx ps:::O.
6.70 179*f. p5+f.cx ps -24. 7917 *c ,p6-e.exps=O.
6.70179* g.p5+g.cxps -4.2R32*e.p7 -c.cx p,<;=O.
6.70179*h.pS+h,exps -IS.17*c.ppl-c.exps=O.
24, 7lJ J7* g.pn+g.cxps -4.2812* f.p7 -f.exp.s:::O,
24,7917*h.p6+h.exps-IS.
17*fppJ-fcxps=O.
4.2832*h,p7+h.cxps-15.17*g.ppl-g.exps:::O;
run,
run;
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